Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development
Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
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HomeMy WebLinkAboutO 092INDEX OTHER ORDER NO. 92
CINGSA Violation of Rule 7 of Storage Injection Order 9
1.--------------------
Emails between ENSTAR and AOGCC re: CINGSA shut-in
pressure data (Attorney — Client emails held confidential in secure
storage)
2. November 19, 2013
AOGCC letter to CINGSA re: Violation of Rule 7 of SIO 9
3. December 5, 2013
CINGSA's response to AOGCC's Nov. 19, 2013 letter
4. December 26, 2013
AOGCC's response and follow up questions to CINGSA's Dec. 5,
2013 response
5. January 30, 2014
CINGSA's response to AOGCC's Dec. 26, 2013 follow up
questions
6. February 14, 2014
AOGCC's letter to CINGSA re: closing of investigation
INDEX OTHER ORDER NO. 92
0
•
THE STATE
GOVERNOR SEAN PARNELL
February 12, 2014
Ms. M. Colleen Starring
President
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
P.O. Box 190989
Anchorage, AK 99519-0989
Re: Violation of Rule 7 of Storage Injection Order 9
Sterling C Gas Storage Pool
Cannery Loop Unit
Cannery Loop Field
Closing of investigation
Dear Ms. Starring:
kl
U, anic" Gar,
333 West Seventh Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska 99501-3572
Main: 907.279.1433
Fax: 907.276.7542
After reviewing Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC's (CINGSA) most recent January
30, 2014 response, CINGSA's responses to earlier AOGCC inquiries and other available
information, the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC) has concluded
that CINGSA acted in a responsible manner and will not be taking an enforcement action
on this incident.
On November 6, 2013, CINGSA notified the AOGCC that a recent shut-in reservoir pressure
survey indicated the average reservoir pressure of the Sterling C Gas Storage Pool appeared to be
above the 1,700 psi limit established by Rule 7 of Storage Injection Order (SIO) 9. In response,
the AOGCC instructed CINGSA that injection activities would only be allowed when the
calculated bottomhole pressure in the CLU S-3 well was below 1,700 psi. The AOGCC initiated
an investigation into the incident. By certified letters on November 191h and December 261h,
2013, the AOGCC requested additional information and data. CINGSA responded on December
5, 2013, and January 3, 2014. Based on review of the information CINGSA provided and other
available information, the AOGCC has determined that prior to shutting in the wells on October
28, 2013, for the required semiannual reservoir pressure survey that a prudent operator would not
have been able to determine that the average reservoir pressure exceeded the 1,700 psi limit
established by SIO 9.
Earlier drilling and reservoir pressure survey results indicated that the CLU S-1 well had
encountered a pocket of gas that was at initial reservoir pressure and that release of this pocket
into the Sterling C Gas Storage Pool effectively reduced the storage capacity of the reservoir.
However, an accurate assessment of the impact of the pocket on the storage capacity was not
possible. The most recent reservoir pressure survey yielded a more accurate assessment of the
impacts on storage capacity: the storage capacity of the pool, at the 1,700 psi limit established in
SIO 9, is less than the 10.5 BCF capacity that the AOGCC certified on May 15, 2013.
i
Violation of Rule 7 of SIO 9 Closing Of Investigation
February 12, 2014
Page 2 of 3
When wells were shut-in on October 28, 2013, the volume of gas in storage was about 1 BCF
less than the AOGCC's certified capacity and nearly 1.5 BCF less than CINGSA's design
capacity. Before the wells were shut-in the calculated bottomhole pressure for the CLU S-3 well
was in excess of 1,700 psi, but since this well is located near the center of the injection wells the
pressure was expected to drop substantially when the wells were shut-in as the reservoir pressure
equilibrated across the pool due to the fact that the volume in storage was significantly less than
the design and certified capacity of the pool. When the pressure did not drop as rapidly as
anticipated CINGSA reported that it had exceeded the 1,700 psi average reservoir pressure limit
established by SIO 9.
Prior to the latest reservoir pressure surveys, the volume of gas in storage and the design and
certified capacity could have caused a prudent operator to conclude that the average reservoir
pressure should be well below the 1,700 psi limit. As a result, an enforcement action is not
justified in this matter.
To prevent exceeding the reservoir pressure limit in the future CINGSA has proposed using the
CLU S-3 well as a monitoring well. However, since the CLU S-3 well is located near other
producers/injectors the pressure it records is not an accurate representation of the average
reservoir pressure. Additionally, if the CLU S-3 well is put into service it would not be suitable
as a monitoring well for an extended period of time. A material balance based method of
determining the average reservoir pressure based on the volume of gas in storage more
accurately measures the average reservoir pressure for compliance with Rule 7 of SIO 9.
Therefore, CINGSA is directed to use its reservoir model to develop a table of volume in storage
versus average reservoir pressure and use this table to determine compliance with the reservoir
pressure limit established in SIO 9. The table shall be updated whenever the reservoir model is
updated to make sure that the table is based on the most up to date data available.
Based on current information the storage capacity certification issued in May 2013 is too high.
Should CINGSA wish to avoid a reduction in the certified capacity, CINGSA should apply no
later than April 1, 2014 to amend SIO 9 to raise the average reservoir pressure limit in Rule 7.
Any such application must be supported by evidence sufficient to warrant the relief requested.
Questions regarding this matter should be directed to Dave Roby at (907) 793-1232.
Sincerely,
z/ /0 ; 4'4�
Cathy P Foerster
Chair, Commissioner
Violation of Rule 7 of SIO 9 Clo3�ing Of Investigation •
February 12, 2014
Page 3 of 3
RECONSIDERATION AND APPEAL
As provided in AS 31.05.080(a), within 20 days after written notice of the entry of this order or decision, or such further time as the
AOGCC grants for good cause shown, a person affected by it may file with the AOGCC an application for reconsideration of the
matter determined by it. If the notice was mailed, then the period of time shall be 23 days. An application for reconsideration must
set out the respect in which the order or decision is believed to be erroneous.
The AOGCC shall grant or refuse the application for reconsideration in whole or in part within 10 days after it is filed. Failure to act
on it within 10-days is a denial of reconsideration. If the AOGCC denies reconsideration, upon denial, this order or decision and the
denial of reconsideration are FINAL and may be appealed to superior court. The appeal MUST be filed within 33 days after the date
on which the AOGCC mails, OR 30 days if the AOGCC otherwise distributes, the order or decision denying reconsideration,
UNLESS the denial is by inaction, in which case the appeal MUST be filed within 40 days after the date on which the application for
reconsideration was filed.
If the AOGCC grants an application for reconsideration, this order or decision does not become final. Rather, the order or decision on
reconsideration will be the FINAL order or decision of the AOGCC, and it may be appealed to superior court. That appeal MUST be
filed within 33 days after the date on which the AOGCC mails, OR 30 days if the AOGCC otherwise distributes, the order or decision
on reconsideration. As provided in AS 31.05.080(b), "[tlhe questions reviewed on appeal are limited to the questions presented to the
AOGCC by the application for reconsideration"
In computing a period of time above, the date of the event or default after which the designated period begins to run is not included in
the period; the last day of the period is included, unless it falls on a weekend or state holiday, in which event the period runs until 5:00
p.m. on the next day that does not fall on a weekend or state holiday.
Cook Inlet Natural,' -Gas
STORACA7a�9�
-1` RECEIVED
January 30, 2014
State of Alaska
JAN 3 0 2014
AOGCG
Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
333 West 7th Ave, Suite 100
Anchorage, AK 99501
Attn: Cathy Foerster — Chair of Commission
RE: Notice of Violation of Rule 7 of Storage Injection Order 9
Sterling C Gas Storage Pool
Dear Chair Foerster:
00k Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
3000 Spenard Road
PO Box 190989
Anchorage, AK 99519-0989
Main:907-334-7980
Fax:907-334-7671
www.cingsa.com
Via Hand Delivery
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC (CINGSA) was granted a Storage Injection Order
on November 19, 2010 by the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC or
"Commission"), allowing it to operate the Cannery Loop Sterling C Pool for underground natural
gas storage service. On November 6, 2013, CINGSA advised AOGCC that it may have
exceeded the maximum reservoir pressure limit of 1700 psia imposed by Rule 7 of Storage
Injection Order 9. On December 5, CINGSA responded to the Commission's Notice of
Violation.
On December 31, 2013, CINGSA received an additional letter from AOGCC requesting
additional information regarding the possible violation. CINGSA has prepared the attached
response to the Commission's request in conjunction with its expert consultants Rick Gentges
and Petrotechnical Resources Alaska.
Any questions concerning the attached information may be directed to John Lau at
907-334-7736.
Sincerely,
1�k 101�d
M. Colleen Starring
President
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
Attachments
CC: Regulatory Commission of Alaska
City of Kenai Planning and Zoning Commission
Cook Inlet Region, Inc.
Salamatof Native Association
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
Supplemental Response to AOGCC NOV
On November 21, 2013, Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC (CINGSA) received a Notice of
Violation (NOV) from the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC) concerning Rule 7 of
Storage Injection Order (SIO) 9. Rule 7 of SIO 9 limits the maximum stabilized reservoir pressure to
1700 psia. The NOV requested that CINGSA provide AOGCC with a written explanation within 14 days of
how the event occurred, what CINGSA planned to do to remedy the situation, and what steps would be
implemented to prevent a reoccurrence. CINGSA provided a written explanation to AOGCC, as
requested, on December 5, 2013. On December 31, 2013, CINGSA received a letter from the AOGCC
requesting that CINGSA clarify certain elements contained in its December 5th response, and supplement
the response with additional shut-in pressure data from the CLU S-3 well. The following is provided in
response to AOGCC's December 315t request to CINGSA.
Response to Question 1:
In October 2013, if CINGSA had had the benefit of the information it has obtained over the last two
months, CINGSA clearly would have ceased injections prior to the shut-in. In light of the pressure
anomalies CINGSA has experienced, CINGSA will take a more conservative approach to ensure strict
compliance with Rule 7 in the future. CINGSA is committed to complying with all of the orders and limits
under which it was granted authority to operate. Below is (1) an explanation of the reasons why CINGSA
did not expect that the stabilized reservoir pressure would exceed the 1700 psi limit, based on the
information available to it in October 2013; (2) a detailed description of what CINGSA has determined to
date regarding the unexpected reservoir pressure experienced; and (3) a description of the corrective
actions it has taken to prevent the violation of Rule 7 of SIO 9 from recurring.
CINGSA was indeed monitoring the shut-in wellhead pressure versus gas inventory data on CLU S-3
during the period prior to the planned late October/early November shut-in period. While so
monitoring and as the CLU S-3 wellhead pressure increased, CINGSA did not believe it would be feasible
for the calculated bottom hole pressure to have exceeded the Rule 7 limit. Based on the gradual
increase in transient reservoir pressure that CINGSA observed in October, CINGSA judged that the
stabilized reservoir pressure, if allowed adequate time to fully stabilize, was unlikely to exceed the
maximum stabilized reservoir pressure of 1700 psia.
When CLU S-1 was initially perforated/completed in February 2012, pressure at the wellhead rose to
approximately 1600 psi within a few days. In contrast, all four of the other CINGSA wells exhibited
wellhead pressures of approximately 400 psi, consistent with the depletion status of the reservoir.
While higher than expected shut-in pressures were observed during the November 2012 Fall shut-in test
and the April 2013 Spring shut-in test, CINGSA believed the higher shut-in pressures were largely
attributable to the initial re -pressurization of the reservoir — i.e. having to overcome capillary pressure
with injection pressures below hydrostatic pressure. Because this storage operation is new and has very
limited historical storage operating data, it was not possible at the time to determine whether the
higher than expected pressure was attributable to pressure transient behavior resulting from re -filling a
depleted gas reservoir for the first time, encountering an isolated pocket of native gas at native pressure
conditions in CLU S-1, or a combination of the two. Thus, it did not appear necessary or desirable to
cease injections of customer working gas prior to the October 2013 shut-in period. CINGSA now
believes the source of this elevated pressure could be attributable in part to high pressure native gas
encountered when the C1c was perforated in CLU S-1, and which has since co -mingled with the main
Cannery Loop Sterling C Gas Storage Pool. With further additional operating history, it should be
possible to assess any incremental volume of native gas associated with this isolated compartment of
the Sterling C1c sand interval. In an effort to aid in this determination, however, CINGSA has refocused
its efforts on refining a computer reservoir modeling study of the reservoir.
A detailed analysis of the Cannery Loop Sterling C Gas Storage Pool using a three dimensional computer
reservoir simulation model was initiated in June 2013, and is ongoing. The purpose of this modeling is
to better understand the pressure transient behavior of the reservoir, assess pressure support
associated with any separate (pressure isolated) compartment of the Sterling C1c sand interval,
estimate any incremental volume of gas associated with the separate compartment, and utilize the
model for planning/optimizing storage operations. The simulation process includes a detailed history
match of the reservoir during primary production and the first 18 months of gas storage operations.
The results of the reservoir simulation provide some support for an hypothesis that the Sterling C1c
interval within CLU S-1 was isolated from the main portion of the reservoir at the time CINGSA
completed the well and that pressure in the C1c was at native discovery pressure (2206 psi) at the time
CINGSA perforated the well. A successful history match of the pressure and production data during
primary depletion and subsequent storage operations through October 2013 was achieved by the
model. This match was possible only by the model incorporating additional pore volume associated
with the C1c interval of the CLU S-1 well.
A prediction run was then made by the model to assess overall reservoir pressure during the November
2013 shut-in test and extending for a period of two years beyond the test. The purpose of the
prediction run was two -fold: 1) to compare the actual weighted average shut-in reservoir pressure at
the end of the shut-in period to the reservoir pressure predicted using the computer model, and 2) to
assess the magnitude of pressure influence associated with any isolated pocket of native gas in the C1c
interval in CLU S-1. The actual weighted average reservoir pressure at the end of the seven day shut-in
was 1798 psi versus a predicted weighted average reservoir pressure of 1758 psi. The difference
between the actual and predicted pressure of individual wells varied from a low of 3 psi to a high of 84
psi, and the average difference was 36 psi, or an overall difference of approximately two percent
relative to actual weighted average reservoir pressure.
CINGSA then employed the model to run a predictive assessment of the decay in reservoir pressure
transients and the pressure influence from the C1c interval of CLU S-1 assuming the reservoir remained
shut-in for an extended period of time beyond the November 2013 shut-in test. FIGURE 1 below
illustrates the predicted (simulated) shut-in reservoir pressure of all five CINGSA wells assuming the
wells had continued to remain shut-in from November 5, 2013 for a period of two full years. The results
of the prediction run indicate that gas influx from the C1c interval in CLU S-1 is likely still occurring and
influencing reservoir pressure. As can be seen in Figure 1, pressures initially decline steadily in the wells
for a period of several months to approximately March of 2014 rising again. The low point in pressure
0
stabilization is approximately 1730 psi; in light of these preliminary results, as previously stated, CINGSA
will pursue an increase in the reservoir pressure allowed by the Commission in Rule 7 in SIO 9.
These results support a conclusion that gas influx associated with the C1c interval of CLU S-1 has
contributed to the higher than expected reservoir pressure observed during the three shut-in pressure
tests that CINGSA has conducted since commencement of storage operations. Such determination was
and is not possible with data available from conventional reservoir analysis and has only recently been
completed after an extensive effort to utilize computer reservoir modeling to examine a more
comprehensive model analysis of the reservoir. The magnitude of simulated influence from the C1c
interval in CLU S-1 on overall reservoir pressure was not apparent prior to this study and is now a
candidate for the most likely causative factor in CINGSA's exceeding the maximum reservoir pressure
stipulated in Rule 7 of SIO 9. Of course, additional real time shut-in pressure data from subsequent April
and November shut-in periods will be necessary to physically confirm or reject these modeling
predictions. Thus, CINGSA does not presently endorse or adopt the modeled result as established facts.
However, this information is provided to AOGCC in response to its December 315t inquiries in order to
assist the Commission with its understanding of the subject matter at hand.
FIGURE 1
1,840
1,820
1,800
a
a
i
%A 1,780
47
L
a
c
3 1,760
L
O
4
M
O
m
1,720
1=
1,700 -
Simulated Shut-in Reservoir Pressure (psia) versus Time
—CLU 5-1
—CLU S-2
CLU S-3
_CLU S-4
—CLU 5-5
Weighted Avg. BHP (Sim.)
1,680 — — — ---
w�ti�\y� ti41�\y� ���\�a ���Q\~� �\��tia titi��A\~Q a�`O�y� �\y��tih tio���\�h ti\�~\~�
Response to Question 2:
ATTACHMENT A is an Excel spreadsheet with the requested daily wellhead and calculated bottomhole
pressure for the CLU S-3 well since June 1, 2013 and is included with this transmittal.
Response to Question 3:
After further consideration of the matter, CINGSA has altered its plans as to CLU S-3. CINGSA intends to
leave CLU S-3 shut-in, for use as a monitoring well, indefinitely. It will only use CLU S-3 for withdrawals
in the event the region experiences a peak weather event and CINGSA requires deliverability out of the
CLU S-3 well. If CLU S-3 is used for withdrawals, there will be a period of time after the well is shut-in
when pressure builds. During such times, the shut-in wellhead pressure of CLU S-3 may not be a reliable
indicator for assessment of dynamic field pressure conditions. CINGSA is monitoring and plotting the
wellhead shut-in pressure of CLU S-3 as a function of gas inventory to establish the correlation between
these operating parameters, and plans to continue to do so. CINGSA included a graph of this data as
Figure 3 in its December 5th response to AOGCC.
In order to ensure effective reservoir pressure monitoring, CINGSA has now applied a dynamic BHP
calculation and display into the operating SCADA system for well No 3. The SCADA system is set to
alarm in the event the calculated BHP of the well exceeds 1680 psi. CINGSA will automatically shut-in at
a calculated BHP of 1690 psi. Screen shots illustrating the SCADA alarm system are attached as
ATTACHMENT B. The protocol for SCADA alarm response is outlined in ATTACHMENT C, ENSTAR's SOP
# 1601.
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
ENSE 0 ENSTAR Natural Gas Company (ENSTAR)
2 Alaska Pipeline Company (APC)
Q NORSTAR Pipeline Company (NORSTAR)
Q Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska (CINGSA)
Natural Gas Company
Title: Control Room Management of Change
No: 1601 Revision No.: 003 Effective Date: 04/15/2013 Page No. 1 of 9
Authorizing Signature: John Lau Title: Director of Transmission Operations
Scope: This procedure outlines the change management process for the transmission and distribution
system monitored and controlled by Gas Control from SCADA. This process includes SCADA
screen development, point-to-point testing, establishing communications between control room
representatives and field technicians, management, and associated field activities as called for in
the Federal Register's Control Room Management outline Sections: 192.631(c)(1), (c)(2), f(1),
f(2) & f(3) respectively.
Policy: Employees shall follow these procedures in order to prevent changes from adversely affecting
Gas Control and to verify that the SCADA system is properly configured and tested.
Guide: Change Procedures
A. This SOP identifies the types of changes and the associated change requirements as
well as the change request format, control rooms documentation format, and the point-to-
point verification guidelines.
Procedure:
Section 1 — Types of Changes
Refer to existing Company documents and procedures for any specific task, for tasks that are not
defined use the general categories below to determine the process to be followed. The general categories
are meant to represent all the operational changes that could affect control room operation; however
operational changes that do not fit into one of these categories should be designated significant by the
recommendation of gas control. Gas controller may also classify any Routine Change as a Significant
Change if operations will be affected in a non -routine way.
A. Non -routine or significant changes: Non -routine or significant changes generally
encompass work that is not performed on an annual basis or could have significant impact on
the operation of the gas system such as:
1. A change that dramatically impacts pipeline capacity
2. Taking a transmission line out of service
3. Operating a pipeline on a temporary basis as is done when pigging procedures are in
effect.
4. Station equipment is installed, removed, or moved.
5. RTU or PLC program changes.
6. Changing alarm set points outside of the Alarm Plan settings.
7. Any additional SCADA screens developed
B. Routine changes: Routine changes generally encompass work that is performed on a
regular basis does not have a significant impact on the daily operation of the gas system,
such as:
1. Adjusting set pressures of regulators
2. Open/Closing valves that are routinely operated
3. Calibrating transducers
4. Updating RTU or PLC programs
5. Orifice plate changes
6. Odorization rate change
7. Repairing valves
C. Changes that do not affect the control room: Changes that do not affect the control room
generally encompasses work that is performed on a system with a MAOP less than 100 psig
This Standard Operating Procedure is property of ENSTAR Natural Gas Company and may not be copied or otherwise used
by anyone other than ENSTAR employees without prior written permission from the Company
ATTACHMENT A - PAGE I OF 9
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
ENm1Wjo Q ENSTAR Natural Gas Company (ENSTAR)
Q Alaska Pipeline Company (APQ
Q NORSTAR Pipeline Company (NORSTAR)
Q Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska (CINGSA)
rvarurar Gas company
Title: Control Room Management of Change
No: 1601 Revision No.: 003 Effective Date: 04/15/2013 Page No. 2 of 9
or work that normally has no impact on the normal daily operation of the system, such as:
1. Cathodic Protection work
2. Work in the right of way that does not affect the daily operation of the pipeline.
3. Changes to monitoring equipment not monitored by SCADA
4. Changes to meters not monitored by SCADA
Section 2 — Change Requirements
A. Non -routine or a significant change
a. Non -routine or significant changes require approval from the appropriate control room
representatives, operator's management, and associated field personnel prior to the
change. In an emergency situation or if unable to contact the appropriate control
room representatives, operator's management, and associated field personnel the
Director of Distribution Operations or equivalent can grant approval. All other
applicable company standards will be followed.
b. Refer to the following sections when performing a non -routine or significant changes
i. Section 4 — Change Request
ii. Section 5 — Point -to -Point Verification
B. Routine changes
a. Routine changes do not require approval from the appropriate control room
representatives, operator's management, and associated field personnel under this
procedure prior to the change, unless deemed a significant change, then see Section
2, A. above. All other applicable company standards will be followed.
b. When performing a routine change Gas Control must be notified of the change. Refer
to the following sections when performing a routine change
i. Section 6 — Notification of Change
ii. Section 5 — Point -to -Point Verification
C. Non -Covered changes
a. Non -covered changes are not covered by this procedure. All other applicable
company standards will be followed.
b. Non -covered changes do not require documentation under this procedure
Section 3 — Control Room Documentation
Reference the following guidelines when performing field changes to determine the correct
process.
A. Sites monitored by SCADA
a. When a change is made to a piece of equipment that affects pipeline safety a point-to-
point verification will be performed on all associated points that affect safety. Refer to
Section 5 — Point -To -Point Verification.
b. When a change is made to a SCADA display that affects pipeline safety a point-to-point
verification will be performed on all associated points that affect safety. Refer to Section 5
— Point -To -Point Verification. For SCADA screen development see section7
c. When a change is made to a piece of equipment that does not affect pipeline safety Gas
Control will be contacted to record the change. Refer to Section 6 — Notification of
Change.
d. When an emergency condition exists Gas Control will be contacted to record the event.
Refer to Section 6 — Notification Of Change
e. An emergency situation as covered in SOP 1105.
This Standard Operating Procedure is property of ENSTAR Natural Gas Company and may not be copied or otherwise used by
anyone other than ENSTAR employees without prior written permission from the Company
ATTACHMENT A - PAGE 2 OF 9
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
ENASTAO Q ENSTAR Natural Gas Company (ENSTAR)
Q Alaska Pipeline Company (APQ
Q NORSTAR Pipeline Company (NORSTAR)
Q Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska (CINGSA)
!Natural Gas Cornaanv
Title: Control Room Management of Change
No: 1601 Revision No.: 003 Effective Date: 04/15/2013 Paae No. 3 of 9
B. Sites that are not monitored by SCADA
a. When a change is made to a piece of equipment Gas Control will be contacted to record
the change. Refer to Section 6 — Notification Of Change.
b. When an emergency condition exists Gas Control will be contacted to record the event.
Refer to Section 6 — Notification Of Change.
c. An emergency situation as covered in SOP 1105.
Section 4 — Change Request
When a change is requested, the requestor will contact the appropriate control room
representatives, operator's management, and associated field personnel with a filled out change request
form that will include but not be limited to the information listed below.
1. Permanent or Temporary Change and the expiration date if the change is temporary is
provided here. If the change is temporary, a copy of the active change is kept physically in
the control room near the sign in sheet as a reminder of activities.
2. If the change is temporary the Originator of this form is responsible for giving notice of the
end of the temporary change. The date is notated and the form is filed with old Change
Requests.
3. Request description — Short description of the change
4. Areas of Impact — Can denote physical and departmental areas of impact.
5. Impact — What impact the change could have on normal operation
6. Time Required — The time required from the start of the process to the end of the process to
make the change and other relevant timing issues.
7. Process — The steps that will be followed when the change is performed
8. Affected Parties — Departments that could be directly affected by the change
9. Change Initiated By — Initiator of the form also informs gas control when the temporary
changes have been concluded.
10. Approval Signatures — Covers items 10). to 15).
11. Any applicable procedures, drawings, and training for directly affected employees.
Upon the approval of a Change Request a Controller will log the approved Change Request in
the Control Room Management of Change Log found on Gas Control's SharePoint Library. The signed
Change Request form is filed with all approved Change Requests in Gas Control.
Section 5 — Point -To -Point Verification
The primary purpose of a point-to-point verification will verify the accuracy of the SCADA displays
and record changes to the operation of the system. Point to Point testing should occur on the same
day or prior to the points going into service. The Alarm Rationalization from the Alarm Management
Plan is followed to update or add the point the Alarm Rationalization spreadsheet if the point is
determined to have any alarming functions. The only times a Point to Point procedure should occur is
during the following:
a. When a change is made to a piece of equipment that affects pipeline safety a point-to-
point verification will be performed on all associated points in SCADA that affect safety.
b. When a change is made to a SCADA display that affects pipeline safety a point-to-point
verification will be performed on all associated points that affect safety.
A. Gas Control will document on the point-to-point verification form the following
information that may apply in the SCADA Change Management Log located on Gas
This Standard Operating Procedure is property of ENSTAR Natural Gas Company and may not be copied or otherwise used by
anyone other than ENSTAR employees without prior written permission from the Company
ATTACHMENT A - PAGE 3 OF 9
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
ENST Q ENSTAR Natural Gas Company (ENSTAR)
Q Alaska Pipeline Company (APQ
Q NORSTAR Pipeline Company (NORSTAR)
Q Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska (CINGSA)
Natural Gas Comnanv
Title: Control Room Management of Change
No: 1601 Revision No.: 003 Effective Date: 04/15/2013 Pacie No. 4 of 9
Control's SharePoint Library.
a. Controllers name
b. Technician name
c. Date
d. Station name or RTU Name
e. Point name
f. Display name(s)
g. Equipment changed
h. Found condition or value in the field
i. Found condition or value in SCADA
j. Type of test performed
k. Test condition or value in SCADA
I. Left condition or value in the field
m. Left condition or value in SCADA
n. Verify SCADA alarm set points match the master alarm set points
o. All SCADA screen changes and additions are API — 1165 compliant. (Specific only to
sections 1, 4, 8, 9, 11.1, and 11.3 of API RP 1165).
B. Testing Process
a. Physical tests should be performed when:
i. It will not be disruptive to system operation
ii. The test will yield a measurable change
b. Simulated tests should be performed when:
i. Physical tests are impractical
ii. A physical test will not yield a measurable change
C. Physical test for an analog point
a. When possible, the controller should issue a command to perform the measurable
change, otherwise the technician can perform the change. The following steps will be
followed when performing the test. Gas Control will record the results in the Control
Room Point -to -Point Verification Form.
i. Verify the value in the field matches the value in SCADA
ii. Perform the change
iii. Verify the value in the field matches the value in SCADA
iv. Perform any additional changes to return the equipment to normal operation
D. Simulated test for an analog point
a. The technician in the field will follow the following steps when performing the test.
Gas Control will record the results in the Control Room Point -to -Point Verification
Form.
i. Verify the value in the field matches the value in SCADA
ii. Disconnect the wire connected to the piece of equipment at the equipment
iii. Verify the SCADA point went to zero (0)
iv. Reconnect wiring
v. Verify values in the field match values in SCADA
E. Physical test for a digital point
a. When possible, the controller should issue a command to perform the measureable
change, otherwise the technician can perform the change. The following steps will be
followed when performing the test. Gas Control will record the results in the Control
Room Point -to -Point Verification Form.
i. Verify the state in the field matches the state in SCADA
ii. Perform the change
This Standard Operating Procedure is property of ENSTAR Natural Gas Company and may not be copied or otherwise used by
anyone other than ENSTAR employees without prior written permission from the Company
ATTACHMENT A - PAGE 4 OF 9
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
ENSENW Q ENSTAR Natural Gas Company (ENSTAR)
Q Alaska Pipeline Company (APQ
Q NORSTAR Pipeline Company (NORSTAR)
Q Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska (CINGSA)
nracurar Gas company
Title: Control Room Management of Change
No: 1601 Revision No.: 003 Effective Date: 04/15/2013 Page No. 5 of 9
iii. Verify the state in the field matches the state in SCADA
iv. Perform an additional changes to return the equipment to normal operation
F. Simulated test for a digital point
a. The technician in the field will follow the following steps when performing the test.
Gas Control will record the results in the Control Room Point -to -Point Verification
Form.
i. Verify the state in the field matches the state in SCADA
ii. Disconnect the wire connected to the piece of equipment at the equipment
iii. Connect a power source to simulate a signal
iv. Simulate the opposite state of the found state
v. Verify the state in the field matches the state in SCADA
vi. Reconnect the wire
Section 6 — Notification of Change
The primary purpose of a notification of change is for Gas Control to be aware of the changes
and for the Operator to record the changes in the Pipeline Operations SharePoint log book.
A. Gas Control will document the change in the Pipeline Operations SharePoint log book
with the following information:
a. Controllers name
b. Technician name
c. Date
d. Site name
e. Equipment changed or event
f. Relevant status information (ie. Found state or value in the field, Left state or value in
the field)
g. Timing of the scheduled changes
Section 7 — SCADA Screen Development
SCADA screens are API — 1165 compliant. (Specific only to sections 1, 4, 8, 9, 11.1, and
11.3 of API RP 1165). A review of the changed or new screen(s) is documented in the
Control Room Management SCADA Screen Development Form (Attachment #3). Before the
screen is implemented all controllers are instructed on the workings of the new or changed
interface.
A. The screen developer or employee overseeing the changes will ensure human factors
are considered:
a. When applicable, screens follow a mapping to actual positions of field equipment.
Most screens use the pipeline schematic. Mapping to the schematic is done as long
as the interface follows the rest of the API 1165 prescribed methods.
b. Screens are not overloaded (signal to noise ratio).
c. Position and size of figures are determined by their relative importance to the viewer.
More important control items are made larger and more central.
d. Consistency of color representation, shapes, symbols and fonts are followed for
similar type screen representations throughout the SCADA system. Normal and
abnormal conditions and shape -coding of device symbols such as pumps, valves and
meters also remain consistent in the screen. ISA Symbol library is used for a
This Standard Operating Procedure is property of ENSTAR Natural Gas Company and may not be copied or otherwise used by
anyone other than ENSTAR employees without prior written permission from the Company
ATTACHMENT A - PAGE 5 OF 9
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
EN=1W44
Q ENSTAR Natural Gas Company (ENSTAR)
Q Alaska Pipeline Company (APQ
Q NORSTAR Pipeline Company (NORSTAR)
Q Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska (CINGSA)
Natural Gas Company
Title: Control Room Management of Change
No: 1601 Revision No.: 003 Effective Date: 04/15/2013 Paae No. 6 of 9
guideline when choosing shape -coding and symbols.
B. Colors and Font considerations
a. The number of colors are kept to a minimum. The colors are chosen to allow an
optimal contrast in colors as well as contrasting with the background on which they
appear.
b. The high priority information should use colors that capture the controller's attention.
Fonts are chosen to be scalable without deterioration in the quality of the display.
Should differing screen resolutions be used, keeping the font with basic lines will
keep numbers and letters legible.
c. When screens are built feedback is taken from gas controllers to confirm that they
are easy to understand and provide the visual cues the controllers are looking for.
C. State Based Points
a. State based points are given to mean open or closed by their colors. A red valve
means a closed valve, while a green valve means an open valve. Alarm states will
also change the colors of blocks surrounding the item in alarm. For more on alarms,
see Alarm Management Plan.
b. The consistency in meaning to color coordinating is essential to helping the
controllers to understand the system at a glance.
This Standard Operating Procedure is property of ENSTAR Natural Gas Company and may not be copied or otherwise used by
anyone other than ENSTAR employees without prior written permission from the Company
ATTACHMENT A - PAGE 6 OF 9 a -
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
2 ENSTAR Natural Gas Company (ENSTAR)
Q Alaska Pipeline Company (APC)
Q NORSTAR Pipeline Company (NORSTAR)
.� . 0 Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska (CINGSA)
Natural Gas Comoan v
Title: Control Room Management of Change
No: 1601 Revision No.: 003 Effective Date: 04/15/2013 Paqe No. 7 of 9
Attachment 1
Alaska Pipeline Company
Control Room Change Request Form
Change Number A Date
Change Number Format= Yeam(1999) & Mordh(01) & Day(01) & Ned Nwilaorrrom Change Log
1) Select One: Permanent Change ❑ Temporary Change ❑ Temperary Expiration Date:
2) Change event has expired. ❑ Actual Expiration Date:
Covered in
If any items on this form are already addressed in the procedure or attachent check the 'Covered in Procedure' box. Procedure
3) Reason For & Description of Change(s) & Expectations
4) Areas of Impact (Physical & Departmental) ❑
5) Implication(s) and Impact(s) of Change to the Affected Areas ❑
6) Timing, time required, time limitations, restrictions, or other relevant timing issues associated. _❑
7) Process for change & contingency plan ❑
8) Names of the management of the affected parties
9)
Change Initiated by
10)
Is this a significant change that requires specific controller training?: Yes ❑ No ❑
If yes, indicate name of trainer.
and attach signed training form.
Approval Signatures
11)
Gas Controller
Date
WA ❑
12)
Measurement Supervisor
Date
WA ❑
13)
Engineering Services Supervisor
Date
WA ❑
14)
Gas Control Supervisor
Date
N/A ❑
15)
Final approval and authorization
Unless Ns is an emergency, i1 ANYboxes Isom item &J.
&ougr 91}, have rwC been chavkcdw,d a is no sigr>saue, do tort sy7n
Ws form.
Date
Control Room Representative (Can be the Control Room Manager/Supervisor or Contrdler)
16) Controller addling entry to the log book
Date
This Standard Operating Procedure is property of ENSTAR Natural Gas Company and may not be copied or otherwise used by
anyone other than ENSTAR employees without prior written permission from the Company
ATTACHMENT A - PAGE 7 OF 9 �, §3
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
ENMS7,A Q ENSTAR Natural Gas Company (ENSTAR)
Q Alaska Pipeline Company (APQ
"■. Q NORSTAR Pipeline Company (NORSTAR)
Q Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska (CINGSA)
Title: Control Room Management of Change
No: 1601 Revision No.: 003 Effective Date: 04/15/2013 Page No. 8 of 9
Attachment 2
Alaska Pipeline Company
., o�..•.
-- Control Room Point to Point
Verification Form
Notification Change Number Date: _
Select One: Routine Change Non -Routine Change
Select One: SCADA Change Non-SCADA Change
Reason For Change:
Pti Pt 2 Pt 1 Pt 2
0
c
O
a
N
E
z
ei
d
x
N
C_
O
d
V
W
N
A
N
N
J
I certify that gas control has reviewed and accepted the change and
that all changes are in compliance with API 1165.
Initiated By(print)
Signature
Approved By(print)
Signature
This Standard Operating Procedure is property of ENSTAR Natural Gas Company and may not be copied or otherwise used by
anyone other than ENSTAR employees without prior written permission from the Company
ATTACHMENT A - PAGE 8 OF 9
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
ENST 0 ENSTAR Natural Gas Company (ENSTAR)
0 Alaska Pipeline Company (APC)
2 NORSTAR Pipeline Company (NORSTAR)
Q Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska (CINGSA)
Natural Gas Companv
Title: Control Room Management of Change
No: 1601 Revision No.: 003 Effective Date: 04/15/2013 Page No. 9 of 9
Attachment 3
t_ Alaska Pipeline Company
Control Room SCADA Screen Development Form
Notification Change Number #
Change Number Format = Year(1999) & MoMh(01) & Day(Ot)
1). Are human factors from AP11165 and SOP1601 considered acceptable?
2). If there are deviations to human factors, explain why:
3).
4).
5).
6).
7).
8).
9).
10).
Date
Yes No N/A
Colors and fonts from API1165 and SOP1601 considered acceptable? Yes No 0 N/A
If there are deviations to colors and fonts, explain why:
State Based Points from API1165 and SOP1601 considered acceptable? Yes No ET N/A
If there are deviations to state based points explain why:
Have all controllers been educated with the new/changed SCADA screen? Yes Lj No N/A
Screen Name
Change Initiated By
uaie
11).
Has the Measurement Supervisor Approved the Change?
Yes No ❑ N/A ❑
12).
Has the Engineering Services Supervisor Approved the Change?
Yes No N/A
13).
Has the Gas Control Supervisor Approved the Change?
Yes No
14).
Approval & Authorization
Unless Cris is an emergency, N ANYboxes hom item 1). Cnough 13). have been marked'No , ieiihouracceptable explarrafion do
nor sign this form.
Control Room Representative (Can be the Control Room MenegeriSupervisor or Controller) Date
Revised 9/21112
This Standard Operating Procedure is property of ENSTAR Natural Gas Company and may not be copied or otherwise used by
anyone other than ENSTAR employees without prior written permission from the Company
ATTACHMENT A - PAGE 9 OF 9
�._ � �
+. �..
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� �`�
r, . .. �.�...
Calculated
CLU S-3 Wellhead
Bottomhole
Wellhead to Bottom Flow Rate
Date
Presssure - psi g
Pressure - psia
Hole Difference
MMcf d
6/1/13
1513
1702
189
10300
6/2/13
1498
1686
188
8400
6/3/13
1490
1677
187
7550
6/4/13
1496
1683
187
8040
6/5/13
1511
1700
189
8910
6/6/13
1516
1706
190
8950
6/7/13
1513
1703
190
8040
6/8/13
1514
1704
190
8300
6/9/13
1519
1709
190
8540
6/10/13
1520
1710
190
8370
6/11/13
1518
1708
190
7990
6/12/13
1521
1712
191
8100
6/13/13
1529
1720
191
8570
6/14/13
1528
1720
192
8190
6/15/13
1529
1721
192
8190
6/16/13
1531
1723
192
8230
6/17/13
1524
1715
191
7170
6/18/13
1515
1705
190
6310
6/19/13
1514
1704
190
6120
6/20/13
1516
1708
192
6320
6/21/13
1515
1706
191
6100
6/22/13
1527
1719
192
7090
6/23/13
1522
1713
191
6170
6/24/13
1517
1708
191
5670
6/25/13
1521
1713
192
2810
6/26/13
6/27/13
6/28/13
6/29/13
6/30/13
7/1/13
1495
1684
189
2710
7/2/13
1462
1659
197
Shut-in
7/3/13
1458
1655
197
Shut-in
7/4/13
1455
1651
196
Shut-in
7/5/13
1455
1651
196
Shut-in
7/6/13
1454
1650
196
Shut-in
7/7/13
1453
1649
196
Shut-in
718/13
1454
1650
196
Shut-in
7/9/13
1453
1649
196
Shut-in
7/10/13
1454
1650
196
Shut-in
7/11/13
1454
1650
196
Shut-in
7/12/13
1454
1650
196
Shut-in
7/13/13
1454
1650
196
Shut-in
7/14/13
1454
1650
196
Shut-in
7/15/13
1454
1650
196
Shut-in
7/16/13
1455
1651
196
Shut-in
ATTACHMENT C - PAGE 1 OF 6
7/17/13
1455
1651
196
Shut-in
7/18/13
1455
1651
196
Shut-in
7/19/13
1456
1652
196
Shut-in
7/20/13
1456
1652
196
Shut-in
7/21/13
1457
1653
196
Shut-in
7/22/13
1457
1653
196
Shut-in
7/23/13
1458
1655
197
Shut-in
7/24/13
1457
1653
196
Shut-in
7/25/13
7/26/13
7/27/13
7/28/13
7/29/13
7/30/13
7/31/13
8/1/13
1462
1659
197
Shut-in
8/2/13
1463
1660
197
Shut-in
8/3/13
1464
1661
197
Shut-in
8/4/13
1464
1661
197
Shut-in
8/5/13
1465
1663
198
Shut-in
8/6/13
1465
1663
198
Shut-in
8/7/13
1466
1664
198
Shut-in
8/8/13
1466
1664
198
Shut-in
8/9/13
1467
1665
198
Shut-in
8/10/13
1467
1665
198
Shut-in
8/11/13
1468
1666
198
Shut-in
8/12/13
1469
1667
198
Shut-in
8/13/13
1469
1667
198
Shut-in
8/14/13
1470
1668
198
Shut-in
8/15/13
1470
1668
198
Shut-in
8/16/13
1471
1669
198
Shut-in
8/17/13
1472
1671
199
Shut-in
8/18/13
1473
1672
199
Shut-in
8/19/13
1473
1672
199
Shut-in
8/20/13
1474
1673
199
Shut-in
8/21/13
1474
1673
199
Shut-in
8/22/13
1475
1674
199
Shut-in
8/23/13
1475
1674
199
Shut-in
8/24/13
1476
1675
199
Shut-in
8/25/13
1476
1675
199
Shut-in
8/26/13
1477
1676
199
Shut-in
8/27/13
1478
1677
199
Shut-in
8/28/13
1479
1679
200
Shut-in
8/29/13
1479
1679
200
Shut-in
8/30/13
1480
1680
200
Shut-in
8/31/13
1481
1681
200
Shut-in
9/1/13
1481
1681
200
Shut-in
9/2/13
1482
1682
200
Shut-in
9/3/13
1483
1683
200
Shut-in
ATTACHMENT C - PAGE 2 OF 6
9/4/13
1484
1684
200
Shut-in
9/5/13
1484
1684
200
Shut-in
9/6/13
1485
1685
200
Shut-in
9/7/13
1486
1686
200
Shut-in
9/8/13
1487
1687
200
Shut-in
9/9/13
1487
1687
200
Shut-in
9/10/13
1488
1689
201
Shut-in
9/11/13
1489
1690
201
Shut-in
9/12/13
1489
1690
201
Shut-in
9/13/13
1490
1691
201
Shut-in
9/14/13
1490
1691
201
Shut-in
9/15/13
1491
1692
201
Shut-in
9/16/13
1491
1692
201
Shut-in
9/17/13
1492
1693
201
Shut-in
9/18/13
1492
1693
201
Shut-in
9/19/13
1493
1694
201
Shut-in
9/20/13
1493
1694
201
Shut-in
9/21/13
1494
1696
202
Shut-in
9/22/13
1494
1696
202
Shut-in
9/23/13
1495
1697
202
Shut-in
9/24/13
1494
1696
202
Shut-in
9/25/13
1496
1698
202
Shut-in
9/26/13
1496
1698
202
Shut-in
9/27/13
1497
1699
202
Shut-in
9/28/13
1497
1699
202
Shut-in
9/29/13
1498
1700
202
Shut-in
9/30/13
1498
1700
202
Shut-in
10/1/13
1498
1700
202
Shut-in
10/2/13
1499
1701
202
Shut-in
10/3/13
1499
1701
202
Shut-in
10/4/13
1500
1702
202
Shut-in
10/5/13
1500
1702
202
Shut-in
10/6/13
1500
1702
202
Shut-in
10/7/13
1501
1704
203
Shut-in
10/8/13
1502
1705
203
Shut-in
10/9/13
1503
1706
203
Shut-in
10/10/13
1503
1706
203
Shut-in
10/11/13
1504
1707
203
Shut-in
10/12/13
1505
1708
203
Shut-in
10/13/13
1506
1709
203
Shut-in
10/14/13
1507
1710
203
Shut-in
10/15/13
1507
1710
203
Shut-in
10/16/13
1508
1712
204
Shut-in
10/17/13
1509
1713
204
Shut-in
10/18/13
1510
1714
204
Shut-in
10/19/13
1511
1715
204
Shut-in
10/20/13
1511
1715
204
Shut-in
10/21/13
1510
1714
204
Shut-in
10/22/13
1513
1717
204
Shut-in
ATTACHMENT C - PAGE 3 OF 6
10/23/13
1514
1718
204
Shut-in
10/24/13
1514
1718
204
Shut-in
10/25/13
1515
1720
205
Shut-in
10/26/13
1515
1720
205
Shut-in
10/27/13
1517
1722
205
Shut-in
10/28/13
1518
1723
205
Shut-in
10/29/13
1518
1723
205
Shut-in
10/30/13
1519
1724
205
Shut-in
10/31/13
1520
1725
205
Shut-in
11/1/13
1520
1725
205
Shut-in
11/2/13
1520
1725
205
Shut-in
11/3/13
1521
1726
205
Shut-in
11/4/13
1521
1726
205
Shut-in
11/5/13
1521
1726
205
Shut-in
11/6/13
1521
1726
205
Shut-in
11/7/13
1521
1726
205
Shut-in
11/8/13
1521
1726
205
Shut-in
11/9/13
1521
1726
205
Shut-in
11/10/13
1522
1728
206
Shut-in
11/11/13
1521
1726
205
Shut-in
11/12/13
1520
1725
205
Shut-in
11/13/13
1520
1725
205
Shut-in
11/14/13
1520
1725
205
Shut-in
11/15/13
1518
1723
205
Shut-in
11/16/13
1517
1722
205
Shut-in
11/17/13
1516
1721
205
Shut-in
11/18/13
1514
1718
204
Shut-in
11/19/13
1512
1716
204
Shut-in
11/20/13
1511
1715
204
Shut-in
11/21/13
1510
1714
204
Shut-in
11/22/13
1510
1714
204
Shut-in
11/23/13
1508
1712
204
Shut-in
11/24/13
1508
1712
204
Shut-in
11/25/13
1507
1710
203
Shut-in
11/26/13
1506
1709
203
Shut-in
11/27/13
1504
1707
203
Shut-in
11/28/13
1501
1704
203
Shut-in
11/29/13
1500
1702
202
Shut-in
11/30/13
1498
1700
202
Shut-in
12/1/13
1497
1699
202
Shut-in
12/2/13
1496
1698
202
Shut-in
12/3/13
1495
1697
202
Shut-in
12/4/13
0
Shut-in
12/5/13
0
Shut-in
12/6/13
0
Shut-in
12/7/13
0
Shut-in
12/8/13
0
Shut-in
12/9/13
0
Shut-in
12/10/13
0--
Shut-in
ATTACHMENT C - PAGE 4 OF 6
12/11/13
0
Shut-in
12/12/13
0
Shut-in
12/13/13
0
Shut-in
12/14/13
0
Shut-in
12/15/13
0
Shut-in
12/16/13
0
Shut-in
12/17/13
0
Shut-in
12/18/13
0
Shut-in
12/19/13
0
Shut-in
12/20/13
0
Shut-in
12/21/13
0
Shut-in
12/22/13
0
Shut-in
12/23/13
0
Shut-in
12/24/13
0
Shut-in
12/25/13
0
Shut-in
12/26/13
0
Shut-in
12/27/13
0
Shut-in
12/28/13
0
Shut-in
12/29/13
0
Shut-in
12/30/13
0
Shut-in
12/31/13
0
Shut-in
ATTACHMENT C - PAGE 5 OF 6 - ,
�' + is s- tk ;,=
0
2500
2000
1500
1000
E
V 'o 500
0
cc
0
0
CLU S-3 Bottomhole Pressure vs. Wellhead Pressure
250 Soo 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
Wellhead Pressure - psig
ATTACHMENT C - PAGE 6 OF 6
•
THE STATE
f
GOVERNOR SEAN PARNELL
December 26, 2013
CERTIFIED MAIL —
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
7009 2250 0004 3911 3507
Ms. M. Colleen Starring
President
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
P.O. Box 190989
Anchorage, AK 99519-0989
Re: Violation of Rule 7 of Storage Injection Order 9
Sterling C Gas Storage Pool
Cannery Loop Unit
Cannery Loop Field
Follow up questions
Dear Ms. Starring:
Alaska Oil and Gas
333 West Seventh Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska 99501-3572
Main: 907.279.1433
Fax: 907.276.7542
Thank you for your December 5, 2013, response to the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission's (AOGCC) November 19, 2013, Notice of Violation letter. After reviewing Cook
Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC's (CINGSA) response, the AOGCC requests CINGSA
respond to the following:
1) With a wellhead pressure monitoring system and supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) system in place, why did CINGSA not detect that the pressure for the shut-in
CLU S-3 well was indicating the reservoir pressure approaching 1700 psi and cease
injection before the limit was reached instead of waiting until the planned shut-in period
at the end of October/early November when results of the pressure monitoring showed
that the bottomhole pressure at the well had exceeded the reservoir limit by
approximately 30 PSI?
2) Please provide an Excel spreadsheet containing the average wellhead pressure and
calculated bottomhole pressure on a daily basis since June 1, 2013, for the CLU S-3 well.
3) CINGSA states the CLU S-3 well will remain shut-in as a pressure monitoring well, but
that the well may be used from time to time if needed to meet injection or production
capacity requirements. If the well is used for injection or production, will there be a
period of time before the near wellbore pressure stabilizes that will make the well an
unreliable indicator of the reservoir pressure? If so, how does CINGSA propose to
provide effective reservoir pressure monitoring during these times?
Violation of Rule 7 of SIO 9 Follow Up Questions
December 26, 2013
Page 2 of 2
Within 30 days of receipt of this letter, CINGSA is requested to provide the AOGCC with
responses to the above questions and requests.
This request is made pursuant to 20 AAC 25.300. The AOGCC reserves the right to pursue
enforcement action in connection with exceeding the pressure limit set forth in Rule 7 of SIO 9
as provided by 20 AAC 25.535. Questions regarding this matter should be directed to Dave
Roby at 907-793-1232.
Sincerely,
V
Cathy P. oerster
Chair, C mmissioner
RECONSIDERATION AND APPEAL NOTICE
As provided in AS 31.05.080(a), within 20 days after written notice of the entry of this order or decision, or such further time as the
AOGCC grants for good cause shown, a person affected by it may file with the AOGCC an application for reconsideration of the
matter determined by it. If the notice was mailed, then the period of time shall be 23 days. An application for reconsideration must
set out the respect in which the order or decision is believed to be erroneous.
The AOGCC shall grant or refuse the application for reconsideration in whole or in part within 10 days after it is filed. Failure to act
on it within 10-days is a denial of reconsideration. If the AOGCC denies reconsideration, upon denial, this order or decision and the
denial of reconsideration are FINAL and may be appealed to superior court. The appeal MUST be filed within 33 days after the date
on which the AOGCC mails, OR 30 days if the AOGCC otherwise distributes, the order or decision denying reconsideration,
UNLESS the denial is by inaction, in which case the appeal MUST be filed within 40 days after the date on which the application for
reconsideration was filed.
If the AOGCC grants an application for reconsideration, this order or decision does not become final. Rather, the order or decision on
reconsideration will be the FINAL order or decision of the AOGCC, and it may be appealed to superior court. That appeal MUST be
filed within 33 days after the date on which the AOGCC mails, OR 30 days if the AOGCC otherwise distributes, the order or decision
on reconsideration. As provided in AS 31.05.080(b), "[tlhe questions reviewed on appeal are limited to the questions presented to the
AOGCC by the application for reconsideration."
In computing a period of time above, the date of the event or default after which the designated period begins to run is not included in
the period; the last day of the period is included, unless it falls on a weekend or state holiday, in which event the period runs until 5:00
p.m. on the next day that does not fall on a weekend or state holiday.
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Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC I
Post Office Box 190989
Anchorage, AK 99519-0989
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Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
Post Office Box 190989
Anchorage, AK 99519-0989
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PS Form 3811, February 2004 Domestic Return Receipt 102595-02-M-1540
Cook Inlet Natural.'
f�aa
STORAQ� ;; ,
December 5, 2013
State of Alaska
Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
333 West 7th Ave, Suite 100
Anchorage, AK 99501
Attn: Cathy Foerster — Chair of Commission
RE: Violation of Rule 7 of Storage Injection Order 9
Sterling C Gas Storage Pool
Dear Chairman Foerster:
Sock Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
3000 Spenard Road
PO Box 190989
Anchorage, AK 99519-0989
Main:907-334-7980
Fax:907-334-7671
www.cingsa.com
Via Hand Delivery
RECEIVED
DEC 0 5 2013
AOGCC
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC (CINGSA) was granted a Storage Injection Order
on November 19, 2010 by the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC),
allowing it to operate the Cannery Loop Sterling C Pool for underground natural gas storage
service. On November 6, 2013, CINGSA advised AOGCC that it may have exceeded the
maximum reservoir pressure limit of 1700 psia imposed by Rule 7 of Storage Injection Order 9.
CINGSA subsequently received a letter from the AOGCC on November 21, 2013 requesting that
it provide AOGCC with an explanation of how the above referenced event happened, what will
be done to remedy the problem, and steps CINGSA intends to implement to prevent a
recurrence.
Enclosed is CINGSA's response to the requested information.
Any questions concerning the attached information may be directed to John Lau at
907-334-7736.
Sincerely,
M. Colleen Starring
President
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
Attachment
CC:
J. Lau
J. Sims
M. Smith
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
Response to AOGCC NOV
On November 21, 2013, Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC (CINGSA) received a Notice of
Violation (NOV) from the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC) concerning Rule 7 of
Storage Injection Order (SIO) 9. Rule 7 of SIO 9 limits the maximum stabilized reservoir pressure to
1700 psia. The NOV requested that CINGSA provide AOGCC with a written explanation within 14 days
of how the event occurred, what CINGSA planned to do to remedy the situation, and what steps would
be implemented to prevent a reoccurrence.
Background
Gas injection and withdrawal activity at the CINGSA facility is interrupted twice annually for the purpose
of conducting a reservoir shut-in pressure test. Results from these tests are used to perform an annual
material balance analysis as required by SIO 9. The material balance analysis serves to verify that all of
the gas that has been injected into the reservoir indeed remains there, can be accounted for, and that
no gas migration from the reservoir has occurred. The shut-in events must be scheduled months in
advance of when they actually occur so that CINGSA's customers can coordinate their gas supply
purchases with producers and curtail their injection/withdrawal nominations with CINGSA when the
facility is shut-in and unable to receive or deliver gas. The most recent shut-in test was conducted from
October 28 — November 4th, and pressure data gathered during the test indicates that CINGSA may have
exceeded the 1700 psia reservoir pressure limit stipulated in SIO 9.
CINGSA contacted the AOGCC on November 6, 2013 to advise AOGCC that reservoir pressure may have
exceeded the 1700 psia limit imposed by Rule 7 of SIO 9. CINGSA provided the notice based upon
wellhead pressure readings that it had recorded during the seven-day shut-in period. CINGSA felt it
prudent to advise AOGCC of the shut-in pressure conditions even though the shut-in data clearly
indicate that pressure within the reservoir had not fully stabilized. An overview of the operating
conditions leading up to the shut-in pressure test is provided below along with steps CINGSA has since
taken to reduce reservoir pressure below the 1700 psia limit, and to prevent a reoccurrence of this
event.
April — October 2013 Injection Operations Summary
The CINGSA facility was last shut-in for pressure testing from April 10-15. With the exception of only a
few days, the facility has since been on continuous injection. Injection rates varied from near zero to
over 35 mmcf/d during May and June as demand fluctuated with weather conditions, but the injection
rate remained fairly constant during July and August at about 16 mmcf/d. During September, injection
rates generally declined through the month to the lowest levels of the summer season and averaged
only 10 mmcf/d. Injection rates rose significantly during October, particularly during the first half of the
month when rates were 20-30 mmcf/d. This higher rate of injection resulted in a more rapid increase in
wellhead pressure on CLU S-3 than had been observed during September, and much of the summer
injection season. Overall, during the 2013 injection season, injection rates averaged about 16 mmcf/d
during the period from April 16th — October 27th. Figure 1 illustrates the daily injection/withdrawal
activity for this period as well as the entire period the CINGSA facility has been in storage service; Figure
1 also includes shut-in wellhead pressure readings from CLU S-3 (gaps in the data are indicative of
periods when CLU S-3 was open for injection and withdrawal activity).
Pressure Stabilization Analysis
Injection activity ceased on the morning of October 28th and all five of the CINGSA wells were shut-in for
pressure monitoring. Total gas inventory at this time was 16,355,212 mcf. Table 1 lists the wellhead
shut-in pressure for all five wells each day during the shut-in period. It also lists the day-to-day decline
in pressure and the overall weighted average pressure of all five wells. On the final day of shut-in,
wellhead pressures ranged from a high of 1609 psig on CLU S-1 to a low of 1521 psig on CLU S-3. The
corresponding calculated bottom hole, or reservoir pressure, for these two wells is 1830 psia and 1730
psia, respectively. It is clear from reviewing this data that wellhead pressure had not fully stabilized
during the week-long shut-in; shut-in pressure on Wells 1, 2, 4, and 5 declined continuously during the
period and rose slightly on Well 3. On the final day of shut-in, field pressure was still declining at a rate
of 1.5-2.0 psi/day. Figure 2 is a plot of the shut-in wellhead pressure of each of the five wells and the
weighted average wellhead pressure data for all five wells.
Generally speaking, all five of the CINGSA wells are used for injections/withdrawals. However, at various
times when storage demand has been low, CLU S-3 has been shut-in for purposes of monitoring dynamic
field pressure conditions as a function of gas inventory. CLU S-3 is located more or less in the center of
the field and the well is completed in three of the five sands that make up the Sterling C Pool. Thus, it
provides a reasonable indication of dynamic field pressure as a function of gas inventory. Figure 3 is a
plot of the shut-in wellhead pressure of CLU S-3 versus gas inventory (as noted above, gaps in the data
are indicative of periods when CLU S-3 was opened up for either injections or withdrawals). It is evident
from this plot that CLU S-3 is in pressure communication with the other wells in the field, and while
shut-in, responds in a consistent and predictable manner to injection activity, albeit with a minor degree
of "lag" in pressure response. While withdrawals have been limited thus far, shut-in wellhead pressure
on CLU S-3 is clearly responding in a consistent and predicable manner to storage withdrawals. CINGSA
will continue to open CLU S-3 for both injection and withdrawal when customer nominations exceed the
capability of the remaining four wells, but will otherwise leave the well shut-in when practicable.
CINGSA believes that shut-in pressure readings obtained from CLU S-3 provide a reasonable indication of
dynamic pressure conditions in the reservoir. Allowing for some degree of pressure "lag", or hysteresis,
Figure 3 illustrates there is a direct relationship between shut-in pressure on CU S-3 and gas inventory.
The degree of hysteresis is a function of reservoir complexity and rock quality (porosity and
permeability), and results from pressure transient behavior within the reservoir as gas expands out into
the greater reservoir during the injection season and returns from it during the withdrawal season.
Recognizing that pressure within the reservoir had not stabilized (i.e. the hysteresis), the shut-in
pressure of CLU S-3 at November 4th suggests that CINGSA exceeded the maximum pressure limit of
1700 psia by approximately 30 psi. However, given adequate time to fully stabilize, it is reasonably
likely that reservoir pressure would have reached equilibrium at or below the 1700 psia limit.
Corrective Measures
The CINGSA facility was placed on withdrawal status on November 4th and has since remained on
withdrawal to reduce reservoir pressure below the maximum approved limit of 1700 psia. As of
December 3, approximately 1067 mmcf of gas had been withdrawn from the facility and wellhead shut-
in pressure on CLU S-3 had declined to 1495 psig on an instantaneous basis, which equates to a
calculated reservoir pressure of 1698 psia. Additionally, CLU S-1 has been used for withdrawals only
during peak periods since early November, and otherwise remained shut-in. During the most recent
shut-in of CLU S-1, which occurred from November 25-29, wellhead pressure initially built up to 1489
psig by mid -day on November 28th before beginning to decline in response to continued withdrawals
from wells 2, 4, and 5. Just prior to re -opening CLU S-1 the following day, its wellhead pressure had
declined to 1485 psig, which equates to a calculated reservoir pressure of 1687 psia. Thus, based on
recorded shut-in wellhead pressure from both CLU S-1 and S-3, reservoir pressure has decreased below
the maximum allowed pressure of 1700 psia.
Going forward, CINGSA generally plans to leave CLU S-3 shut-in for pressure monitoring. When
practicable or when needed to meet customer injection or withdrawal nominations, CLU S-3 may be
used or injection or withdrawal service. . CINGAS will monitor wellhead pressure on CLU S-3 along with
storage inventory as a means of remaining below the maximum reservoir pressure limit of 1700 psia
stipulated in SIO 9. In addition, CINGSA has prepared a graph that correlates the wellhead shut-in
pressure on CLU S-3 with its correlative reservoir pressure (Figure 4). This graph has been distributed to
all key operating personnel so that injections can be reduced or terminated as necessary when surface
pressure on CLU S-3 approaches 1500 psig.
Finally, CINGSA's analysis of overall reservoir/well performance indicates the storage reservoir and wells
are performing in a consistent and reliable manner, and there are no indications or evidence of any
safety or integrity issues. CINGSA is evaluating the need for greater storage capacity than is possible
within the constraints of the current maximum reservoir pressure limit of 1700 psia and will likely
petition the AOGCC for an increase in maximum reservoir pressure in the near future.
Figure 1
120.00
100.00
80.00
v
60.00
E
E 40.00
w
0 20.00
z
3 0.00
c -20.00
Ii -40.00
C
-60.00
-80.00
-100.00
titi
tiIN
Fib
Historical CLU S-3 Shut-in Wellhead Pressure vs. Rate Trend
- - Daily Inj/Wdrl Rate - mmcf/d
1600
1400 -OV
a
d
1200 N
v
a
1000
a
s
v
800 3
c
600 H
M
V1
400 u
200
15
ate
• CLU S-3 Shut-in Wellhead Pressure - psig
CINGSA Fall 2013 Wellhead Shut-in Pressures
1640
�- —
1620
Y
00
-—CLU Storage 1
a
1600
-- -- - -- 0 CLU Storage 2
-
4A
n` 1580
;"CLU Storage 3
X
o
* * * CLU Storage 4
s 1560
-- — -- --
---
--
3
X CLU Storage 5
1540_.--
—+— Field Weighted
�^
Avg. Press.
1520
-
1500
10/29
10/30
10/31 11/1 11/2 11/3 11/4
Shut-in Date
Figure 3
1800
1600
1400
CD
U)
m 1200
L
vi 1000
d
CL
800
ev
600
400
200
0
Figure 4
2500
2000
0.
v
L
a
r 1000
E
0
V
m 500
CINGSA
Pressure vs. Inventory Hysteresis
wil
XX
*Actual Shut-in Pressure vs. Inventory - CLUS-3
Pressure
* Fall 2012 Weighted Average Shut-in Wellhead
Pressure
*Spring 2013 Weighted Average Wellhead Shut-
in Pressure
■ Fall 2013 Weighted Average Wellhead Shut-in
Pressure
5,000,000 10,000,000 15,000,000 20,000,000
Total Field Inventory, Mscf
CLU S-3 Bottomhole Pressure vs. Wellhead Pressure
u
0 250 500 750 1000 1250
Wellhead Pressure - psig
1500 1750 2000
•
40
Table 1
Well Name
CLU 5-1
CLU S-2
CLU S-3
CLU S-4
CLU 5-5
Weighted Avg. WHIP (WAP)
WAP Change
Well Name
CLU S-1
CLU S-2
CLU S-3
CLU 5-4
CLU S-5
Weight Factor*
(Storage Pore -feet =
(Por.•net MD•11-Sw))
70.235
47.696
24.024
97.011
93.155
332,121
Weight Factor' - based on Ray Eastwood Log Model
Wellhead Shut-in Pressures (Dsie) and Dates
10 29 2013
10 30 2013
10 31 2013
11 1 2013
11 2013
11 3 2013
11 4 2013
1619.5
1617.1
1615.2
1613.2
1611.5
1611.0
1609.2
1608.0
1605.7
1604.0
1602.5
1601.2
1600.4
1599.6
1517.9
1519.1
1519.5
1519.6
1519.5
1520.4
1520.7
1602.1
1596.9
1592.5
1588.7
1585.5
1583.0
1580.9
1589.2
1581.2
1576.2
1572.0
1568.7
1566.6
1564.9
1596.9
1592.4
1589.1
1586.2
1583.8
1582.3
1580.7
Weighted Average Pressure (Day -to -Day Change)
Dav2vs.Dav1 Dav3vs.Dav2 Dav4vs.Dav3 DavSvs.Dav4 Dav6vs.Dav5 Dav7vs.Dav6
4.5 -3.3 -2.9 -2.4 -1.5 -1.6
Individual Well Pressure (Day -to -Day Change)
Dav 2 vs. Dav 1
Dav 3 vs. Dav 2
Dav 4 vs. Dav 3
Dav 5 vs. Dav 4
Dav 6 vs. Dav 5
Dav 7 vs. Dav 6
-2.4
-1.9
-2
-1.7
-0.5
-1.8
-2.3
-1.7
-1.5
-1.3
-0.8
-0.8
1.2
0.4
0.1
-0.1
0.9
0.3
-5.2
-4.4
-3.8
-3.2
-2.5
-2.1
-8
-5
-4.2
-3.3
-2.1
-1.7
0
THE STATE Alaska Oil and Gas
01ALASKA Con-servation Commission
GOVERNOR SEAN PARNELL 333 West Seventh Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska 99501-3572
Main: 907.279.1433
Fax: 907.276.7542
Novemberl9, 2013
CERTIFIED MAIL —
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
7012 3050 0001 4812 5641
Ms. M. Colleen Starring
President
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
PO Box 190989
Anchorage, AK 99519-0989
Re: Violation of Rule 7 of Storage Injection Order 9
Sterling C Gas Storage Pool
Cannery Loop Unit
Cannery Loop Field
Dear Ms. Starring:
On November 6, 2013, John Lau of Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC (CINGSA)
contacted the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC) to report that the results
of a recent shut-in reservoir pressure survey for the Sterling C Gas Storage Pool indicated the
reservoir pressure appeared to be above the 1700 psi limit imposed by Rule 7 of Storage
Injection Order 9 (SIO 9).
Within 14 days of receipt of this letter, CINGSA is requested to provide AOGCC with an
explanation of how this event happened, what will be done to remedy this problem, and what has
been or will be done to prevent its recurrence.
This request is made pursuant to 20 AAC 25.300. The AOGCC reserves the right to pursue
enforcement action in connection with exceeding the pressure limit set forth in Rule 7 of SIO 9
as provided by 20 AAC 25.535. Questions regarding this matter should be directed to Dave
Roby at 907-793-1232.
Sincerely,
Cathy P oerster
Chair, Commissioner
Violation of Rule 7 of SIO 9
November 19, 2013
Page 2 of 2
AND APPEAL
As provided in AS 31.05.080(a), within 20 days after written notice of the entry of this order or decision, or such further time as the
AOGCC grants for good cause shown, a person affected by it may file with the AOGCC an application for reconsideration of the
matter determined by it. If the notice was mailed, then the period of time shall be 23 days. An application for reconsideration must
set out the respect in which the order or decision is believed to be erroneous
The AOGCC shall grant or refuse the application for reconsideration in whole or in part within 10 days after it is filed. Failure to act
on it within 10-days is a denial of reconsideration. If the AOGCC denies reconsideration, upon denial, this order or decision and the
denial of reconsideration are FINAL and may be appealed to superior court. The appeal MUST be filed within 33 days after the date
on which the AOGCC mails, OR 30 days if the AOGCC otherwise distributes, the order or decision denying reconsideration,
UNLESS the denial is by inaction, in which case the appeal MUST be filed within 40 days after the date on which the application for
reconsideration was filed.
If the AOGCC grants an application for reconsideration, this order or decision does not become final. Rather, the order or decision on
reconsideration will be the FINAL order or decision of the AOGCC, and it may be appealed to superior court. That appeal MUST be
filed within 33 days after the date on which the AOGCC mails, OR 30 days if the AOGCC otherwise distributes, the order or decision
on reconsideration. As provided in AS 31.05.080(b), "[tlhe questions reviewed on appeal are limited to the questions presented to the
AOGCC by the application for reconsideration."
In computing a period of time above, the date of the event or default after which the designated period begins to run is not included in
the period; the last day of the period is included, unless it falls on a weekend or state holiday, in which event the period runs until 5:00
p.m. on the next day that does not fall on a weekend or state holiday.
M
rq
Ln For delivery information visit our website at WWW.Usps.como
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fU Sent To Ms. M. Colleen Starring
r-q ---------------- President
C3 Street, Apt. No. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
r%- or PO Box No. Post Office Box 190989
City State, ZIP Anchorage, AK 99519-0989
:ro
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1. Article Addressed to:
Ms. M. Colleen Starring
President
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC
Post Office Box 190989
Anchorage, AK 99519-0989
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(Transfer from service label'
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Attorney — Client emails held confidential in secure storage
0
0
Roby, David S (DOA)
From:
Roby, David S (DOA)
Sent:
Wednesday, November 13, 2013 10:00 AM
To:
'John Lau'
Cc:
Moira Smith; Colleen Starring; Richard Gentges
Subject:
RE: CINGSA
John,
You're correct in that injection must be suspended until the average reservoir drops below 1700 psi, but as a point of
clarification once injection does commence again the average reservoir pressure must be maintained at or below 1700
psi.
Use of the No. 3 well to monitor the reservoir pressure is acceptable, we'd also be open to other methods of
determining average reservoir pressure if you could demonstrate that they'd provide satisfactory results.
Regards,
Dave Roby
(907) 793-1232
From: John Lau [mailto:John.LauOenstarnaturalcias.com]
Sent: Monday, November 11, 2013 9:48 AM
To: Roby, David S (DOA)
Cc: Moira Smith; Colleen Starring; Richard Gentges
Subject: RE: CINGSA
Dave
I would like to confirm our telephone discussion of current CINGSA operations,
• CINGSA will suspend gas injections until a stabilized reservoir pressure can be demonstrated at 1700 psi or less.
• Continued shut-in use of CINGSA No. 3 as a monitor well will suffice to track stabilized reservoir pressure.
John
John J Lau
ENSTAR Natural Gas, Director
John. Lau Penstarnaturaleas. com
(907)-264-3736 Office
(907)-244-3980 Cell
From: Roby, David S (DOA) [mai Ito: clave. robyaalaska.gov]
Sent: Friday, November 08, 2013 9:58 AM
To: John Lau
0
Cc: Moira Smith; Colleen Starring; Pic iard Gentges
Subject: RE: CINGSA
John,
In regards to your fourth bullet displacement of withdrawals is not the determining factor for when gas injection may
occur. Gas injection may occur only when it can be demonstrated that the reservoir pressure is less than the limit
established by Rule 7 of Storage Injection Order 9.
Regards,
Dave Roby
(907) 793-1232
From: John Lau[mailto:3ohn.Lau((Ienstarnaturalgas.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2013 2:00 PM
To: Roby, David S (DOA)
Cc: Moira Smith; Colleen Starring; Richard Gentges
Subject: CINGSA
Dave
As a follow up to our conversation this morning on the CINGSA injection pressure limit.
• CINGSA believes the 1700 psi stabilized downhole pressure limit as set by the AOGCC has been reached.
• CINGSA suspects reaching the 1700 psi limit prematurely is due to perforating a native pressure zone in CINGSA
No. 1.
• Additional net gas injection will not occur
• Gas can be injected as a matter of displacement of withdrawals
• CINGSA will continue to refine the reservoir model and schedule a meeting with the AOGCC to review
Let me know if I missed anything
Thank you in advance
John
John J Lau
ENSTAR Natural Gas, Director
John.Lau@enstarnaturalgas.com
(907)-264-3736 Office
(907)-244-3980 Cell
Roby, David S (DOA)
From: John Lau <John.Lau@enstarnaturalgas.com>
Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2013 11:31 AM
To: Roby, David S (DOA)
Subject: RE: CINGSA Shut In Data
Dave
See responses below. Feel free to call cell 244-3980
From: Roby, David S (DOA) [mailto:dave.roby0alaska.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2013 10:50 AM
To: John Lau
Cc: Richard Gentges
Subject: RE: CINGSA Shut In Data
John,
A couple of quick questions.
First, the pressure for CLU-S3 is wising throughout the shut in period. I assume this is because the well hadn't been used
for injection recently, correct? Yes
Second, the pressures reported are all wellhead readings, correct? And if so, what is the adjustment used to extrapolate
the WHP to BHP for each of the wells? Using a common datum of 5000 ft we calculate 216 psi additional pressure for
downhole calculations.
Thanks,
Dave Roby
(907) 793-1232
From: John Lau[mailto:John.Lau@enstarnaturalgas.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 06, 2013 9:52 AM
To: Roby, David S (DOA)
Cc: Richard Gentges
Subject: CINGSA Shut In Data
John J Lau
ENSTAR Natural Gas, Director
John. Lau(@enstarnaturaleas.com
(907)-264-3736 Office
(907)-244-3980 Cell
E
•
Roby, David S (DOA)
From: John Lau <John.Lau@enstarnaturalgas.com>
Sent: Tuesday, November OS, 2013 9:00 PM
To: Roby, David S (DOA)
Subject: CINGSA
Dave
We finished our fall season shut in for CINGSA. There are some interesting developments I would like to discuss. Are
you available Wednesday?
Thank you in advance
John Lau
ENSTAR/CINGSA