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Home My WebLink AboutCO 105 B• Image Project Order File Cover Page XHVZE This page identifies those items that were not scanned during the initial production scanning phase. They are available in the original file, may be scanned during a special rescan activity or are viewable by direct inspectionQof the file. 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IIIII BY: Maria Date: /s/ Comments about this file: Quality Checked III II'lll III III III 10/6/2005 Orders File Cover Page.doc • • Index Conservation Order lOSB Middle Ground Shoal 1. June 9, 1973 Notice of Hearing and Affidavit of Publication 2. ----------------- Transcript and Exhibits Conservation Order lOSB ~ ~ STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOUCES DIVISION OF OIL AND GAS Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Committee 3001 Porcupine Drive Anchorage, Alaska 99501 Re: The hearing called by the Alaska ) Oii and Gas Conservation Committee ) pursuant to Title II Alaska Admin- ) istrative Code, Section 2009 to hear ) testimony to determine if a major ) equipment failure constitutes a situa- ) tion warranting unrestricted produc- ) tion of oil and flaring of excess gas. ) IT APPEARING THAT: Conservation Order No. 105-B Middle Ground Shoal Field Platform "A" Shel i Oi i Corporation, Operator MGS nArr~ nBn~ nCn~ rrDrr~ rrEr-~ rrFrr and "G" Oil Pools. August 30, 1973 i. The Oil and Gas Conservation Committee on its own motion called a hearing to hear testimony on the flaring of gas from the referenced platform. A notice of public hearing was published in the Anchorage Daily News on June 9, 1973 pursuant to Title II, Alaska Administrative Code, Section 2009. 2. A public hearing was held on June 21, 1973 in the City Council Chambers in Anchorage at which time applicant and others were heard. FINDINGS: i. The applicant has installed a centrifugal gas compressor to compress produced excess casinghead gas for movement to shore where a market exists. 2. On h4ay 26, 1973, a major equipment failure occurred in the compression equipment and it became impossible to move the produced gas to shore, the reby necessi#ating flaring of excess gas. 3. Factory rebuilding, replacement, and alignment of damaged equipment will take at least two and possibly three more weeks. 4. Due to the urgency of a decision the Committee orally issued substantially the order included as Rules I and 2 of this order. 5. The Committee makes no findings regarding the economics of the situation nor of potential reservoir damage. CONCLUSION: The temporary venting or flaring of excess casinghead gas and continued pro- duction of oil from the referenced platform is reasonable while equipment is being repaired . ~~ Conservation 0 rder 105-8 Page 2 August 30, 1973 ~JOW, THEREFORE, IT IS OFFERED THAT: Rule I. Flaring or venting of excess casinghead gas from Platform "A" in the Middle Ground Shoal Oil Field is permitted until 7:00 AM ADST August 3, 1973 or until such earlier date as equipment is again functional. Rule 2. By Administrative approval the Committee may extend the period pro- vided for in Rule #~I thirty days. DONE at Anchorage, Alaska, and dated August 30, 1973. ~ n. ~,~~. Thomas R. P~larsha I I , J r. , Executive Secretary Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Committee Concurring: Homer L. E3urrell, Chairman Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Committee ~G 0. K. Gilbreth, Jr., M er Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Committee r ALASKA O I L AND GAS CONSERVAT IOPd CO"~1P1 I TTEE October 13, 197?_ ~1r. John C. Schillereff Amoco Production Company P. 0. Box 779 Anchorage, Alaska 99510 Dear P'1r. Schi I lereff: Re; Administrative P.Jiddle Ground Oil Pools Decision No. 105-A.I Shoal Field f~1GS "A", „E;, "F", and '`G~'' Pursuant to Order No. 3 of Conservation Order No. l05-A, the Oil and Gas Conservation Committee hereby further amends Buie No. I and Rule No. 7 of Conservation Order No. 1+~5 to read as follows: Rule No. I ''Casinghead gas in excess of the maximum amount that can be beneficially utilized may be flared no later than 7:00 A. P~., AST, November I, (972." Rule No. ?_ "Effective no later than 7:00 A. P~~., AST, November i, 197?_, the flaring or venting of casing head gas from the ~"iddle Ground Shoal Field is prohibited, except for the amount necessary for adequate safety flares and except in emergencies." Unexpected delay in the receipt and subsetJuent installation of equipment necessary to handle the excess casinghead gas from the Granite Point Platforms Anna and Bruce has been recognized by the Oil and Gas Conservation Committee. OIL, __,.-. _._.._ ____._ N.._._.~_,._._.__ ,~ ~~jp' .~~ Thomas R. i-larsha I I , J r. Executive Secretary Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Gommittee y R~,r,,{~,~ ~' -~ .d ` i~i ~ ~ - ' yy ~ ~` '1 4 \I ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~rloN Cow Concurre e: i{omer L. Burre I I ,~ Cha i~rman Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Committee 0. K. Gi lbreth, Jr., ^lembe~~~~~~~~ Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Gommittee nil". im ~ • P R O C E E D I N G S Mr. Burrell: Good morning gentlemen. This is a hearing of the Alaska Oil and Gas Conserva#ion Committee. Subject is the Piddle Ground Shoal Field Platform A, which is operated by Shell Oil Corporation and it relates to Middle Ground Shoal A, B, C, D, E, F, and G oil pools. The Notice of Public Hearing on this subJect was published June 9, 1973 in the Anchorage i)aify News. The subject is the flaring of excess casinghead gas resulting from a major equipment failure in the gas system on Platform A in Middle Ground Field. ' The issue before the Committee is whether or not this situation is such as to warrant un-restricted production of oil and flaring of the excess gas. I~e'd like to hear the testimony from the applicants on this subJect. My name is Homer Burrell, i am Chairman of the Committee. To m~/ right is OR K, Gilbreth, Jr., Chief Petroleum Engineer and member of the Oil and Gas Conservation Committee, to my left, ~qr. Thomas p, a~arshall, Jr., Chief Petroleum Geologist, of the Division of Oil and Gas and member of the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Committee. is the applicant ready to put on the testimony? We will request that any witnesses ifi they have not previously been qualified as experts s© testify and that they be sworn. Mr. Marshall will swear them. Mr. Joe Rudd: And if I may say a few words, by way of introduction we'll Mr, Burrell: Alright, let the record show that Mr. Joe Ruddts add- ressing us, • • Mr. Joe Rudd: We will present two witnesses, one Mr. R. D. Bates, of Shell ail Company, who will review the history of production at Middle Ground Shoal since the compressor was installed, the difficulties in general fierms that has been experienced with the compressor and go into some of the reservoir and economic considerations that are envotved in the request that Shell. has made. Second, we would have Mr. Tom P~chpg~os testify who is a representative of the manufacturer and then of the. compressor unit which is in question .here. Mr. Burrell: Excuse me, Mr. Rudd, would you identify both, would you bath spell Mr. Psichogios name and identify the men doing it. 1 can neither. Mr. Rudd: Yes, Mr. Psichogios if I'm correct, he can correct me it I'm wrong is Psi Mr. Burrell: Tsi? T Mr. Rutld°: Ps i Mr. Burrell: Psi Mr. Rudd: Psichogios. Mr. Burrell: Okay. Mr. Psichogrios; That correct, that's pronounced Psichogios. Mr. Burrell: Thank you sir. And who does aAr. Psichogios represent, for the record. Mr. Rudd; Solar Mr. Burrell: Solar Mr. Psichogios: Solar Division International Harvester. Mr. Burrell. Solar Division of International Harvester. Thank you. -z- C~ • Mr. Rudd: With that t'd ask Mr. Bates to take the stand and. be sworn and qualified as a witness. Mr. Burge d: Thank you Mr. Rudd. Mr, Bates: -ay name is, my name is R. D. Sates. I'm a graduate of the Un~versi#y of Arizona with a Bachelor's degree in Mining Engineering. I've been employed with Shell Oil the last I~ years with assignments in Mexico, Louisiana, California and Alaska. I have had two assignments concerning Alaska. First in 1966 through 1968, when 1 resided in Anchorage, the second which Ts my current assignment, starting in May of 1972. 1 am currently the Division Mechanical Engineer' West Coast Division. My responsibilities cover surface equipment and systems in the states of California and Alaska. Mr. Gilbreth: Mr. Bates, are you registered? Mr. Bates: Ido sir I am not. Mr. Burrell: Are you registered in any state? Mr. Bates: No sir. Mr. Burrell: Without objection, his educational qualifications are acceptable as an expert wi#ness and i'II ask Mr. Marshall to swear him in. Mr, Marshall: Would you please stand and raise your right hand. in the matter now at hearing do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God? Mr. Bates: i do. Mr. Marshall: Please be seated then. Mr, Burrell: Please proceed with the testimony in this case. Mr, Bates: Thank you. As Shell's and the SAS group's representative -3- • • at this hearing, i plan to review our selection of equipment which was made in 1971 to meet the requirement set forth in the State Conservation Order 105, and our operating experience with this equipment to date. i'Il also review our current equipment break-down situation. and our alternative methods of operating or producing P~~iddle Ground Shoal Platform A. I will present both the advantages and disadvantages of alternate methods of operating and I will ask Mr. Tom Psichogios a representative from Solar, to present a technical dissertation on the equipment, the nature of the equip- ment, and the nature of our failure. Mr, Marshall: Pardon me Just a minute, i noticed that that mike is a little funny. Are we coming through okay? Mr, E3ates: Shell specified a complete gas processing package being, con- sisting of a turbine driven compressor for sales and dehydration package in later 1971 to ship gas to the beach, to our sales point. This equipment was specified to be capable of shipping four million cubic feet a day of gas at .:300 psi platform discharge. This discharge was required to meet our sales conditions on the beach, which are 175 psi. A solar,saturn 1100 horse-power turbine driving a York 24,000 rpm compressor, was selected for each platform. The MGS platform A compressor has a 350 psi discharge pressure capability. it can handle up to six million cubic feet per day of gas. This package provides sufficient pressure to allow complete dehydration, complete being defined as within spectticiations of the gas and shipping of the gas to shore. You will note that it also has excess capacity which a lows_it to take surges in the gas system and continue to ship the maximum volumes of gas. .Such surges would occur say when a gas lift compressor is taken off the line on the platform or when minor upset occurs on the platform and-you go into some. type of surging condition. -4- • • We selected rotating equipment because of its light;we€~ht the nature of rotating equipment with low orders of magnitude vibrations; and the way that these fit are tirnttations in our requirements in offshore environments. Our Middle Ground Shore Platforms are very tight on space. We're required to cantilever this equipment on the side of the pia#form so the light weight became very important,,:. We also favored the this kind equipment because of the low order of magnitude of vibrations and therefore the low vibrations trans- mitted into our structures and our decks. Overall we have found that operating costs and equipment availability with rotating equipment generally exceed that of reciprocating equipment, which also weighed into our consideration. Now we feel that these criteria are impor- tant in off-shore environment and we also selected the high speed equipment because of the necessity to meet our discharge requirements and meet the market with the gas at the market pressure. ttd like to present a brief operating history of the unit, again, I'11' refer portions of the in-depth technical testimony to Mr. Psichogios. I will htahlight the nature of the break-down and the nature of our operating problems. This compressor on A, has operated generally compressing abou# four million cubic feet a day of gas. We have generally been selling about 2.75 million cubic feet of gas. You will notice that we're over-compressing our gas volumes. This over-compression volume is put back into the suction system, the gas suction system on the platform and provides stable suction conditions for ail gas using equipment on the platform. 1'd tike to present my first exhibit, Exhibit 1, which provides an oper- sting history of this piece of equipment on Platform A. -5~- • • Mr. Burrell: Excuse me, Mr. Rudd, are there tacks there ~u can use to hold it steady? !~~ ~-~.s Mr. Bemis: Yes. Mr.Burrell: Okay. Mr The total availability for the -can you hear what 1 say? Mr. Burrell: That's what I'm trying to decide right now, we can't hear you Mr. Gitbreth: Talk louder. Mr. f_ The total availability Mr. Burrell.; Talk loudly, please sir. a #~ • Mr, The total availability of the unit on Platform A,-this is the total package consists of compression equipment and dehydration equipment. From January I to May 26, when we had our major failure, it was 88~. During the period since the start-up, we had eight major shut-dawns, all of which, most of which you will note, are related to the gas compressor seal replace- merit. This was a type. of failure which we find does occur quite often on equipment and as we had excessive seal leakage, not complete failures but leakage, we would shut the unit down and replace the leaking seal. Now this is primarily an effort to provide adequate lubrication of the equipment and conserve the tube oil. In constrast, Platform C has had 96.5 availability of the total package, with a twin unit. All the equipment on both platforms is the same. In late April,, in this period, we begin to recognize that the compres- OY sw~e drive shaft was experiencing excessive vibrations, expecially while rotating at high speeds. A thorough analytical study of the unit was re- quested of Solar in fate April and following this request a study was started. -6- • • This study showed that by reducing the clearance between the output bearings and the compressor's gear boxes, the gear box not at#ached to the compressor, but by shaft, the gear box between the turbine and the compressor, that this vibration in the shaft could be reduced. This apparently did reduce an inherent critical type of speed in the equipment to accept~6le levels. On May 25, the unit was shut down, the bearing was installed and on May 26 the unit was started up. After we ran the unit to 90~ of ratc~e~ we decided that we should let it run at warm up period to bring everything into a steady condition and lobe oil to-the proper temperatures and this type of thing. We left the unit unattended for about a twenty minute period, these units normally operate unattended, and during this period we had our failure, during this warm-up period. The bl-ief description of the failure would be that the rotor assembly and compressor apparently caused some vibration and the shaft connecting the gear box and the compressor was bent at about a 4g degree angle. The seal on g ~'~ z e, d the in-board end or the end near the turbine seuzed on the shaft and the coupling between the shafts on the gear box and the shaft on the compressor failed, That is not necessarily the sequence of the failure, but those are the fai:led items; Visual inspection of this equipment has shown that this is the major extent of the failure and repairs are now being made to make the equipment fike new. These repairs are under way. We are currently estimating that the repairs will take on the order to two to three weeks. The equipment is at the manufacturer's plant in York, Pennsylvania. Mr. Gilbreth: Excuse me, is that two or three weeks from now? Mr, Bass: Yes sir. On June 13 and 14, a controlled performance test- -7- ~ • was conducted on the twin Platform C Unit, to determine the operating charact- eristics and to assist and to define the problems on the Platform A Unit. These same tests were conducted on competitor's units. in California prior to conducting the tests on our platform. The tests, the units in California were s mitiar to our units. i will not necessarily call them twins, but they are very similar, The evaluation of the data on Platform C is still progressing, however, we do know that the Platform C Unit operates satisfactorily in the required ranges required to ship excess gas to the beach. t'1I ask Solar's rep re- sentative to thoroughly describe the failure, the tests to date and the re- sults that we have seen. The test indicated that. the vibrator, the compres- sor vibrates at a second critical speed and that this vibration is probably magnif®d by the gear box. This is a type of vibration #hat is very hard to define, it'.s very hard to analyze and this is the type of thing that leads to the amount of time to analyze the data. We feel now that the compressor being rebuilt with very close 1•olerance and very close balancing of the equip- ment will provide satisfactory operating conditions in the range that we mast shiQ gas, Concurrent with this Solar with their sub-contractors is embarking on a complete re-design of the compressor gearbox package. Qur intent will be to re-build the compressor, re-install it and have available-the design or redesign for additional equipment should this type of thing occur in the future. ate at this time will not change the compressors on A and C to the new design units we can analyze thoroughly and know what the design would be. Currently we have two viable gas handling methods available on Platform A, while the compressor is shulr-down. The first of these is to conduct, con- tinue to conduct production on Platform A in total and flare the excess gas. 8_ • • The second of these is to reduce or eliminate the flare probably by utilizing a portion of our gas lift capacity on the platform and .then be able to ship 2.75 million cubic feet per day of gas with this equipment. This wil( result in a production curtailment or loss during this period. l~lr. Burrell: Excuse me, Mr. Bates, it's 2.75 million cubic feet per day of casinghead gas. is produced with the oil at your normal production rate? Mr. Bates: Yes, that sir, that is the volume of gas which is available for sales after emergency flare volume and after our own consumption on the platform. ~Ir. Burrell: And t think the emergency flare on that platform is three quarters of a million Mr. Bates; Yes, we're allowed .75 million a day. Mr. Burrell: 7hat~s 2.75 plus .75 is the amount of casinghead gas thats produced at the normal rates, in other words Mr. Bates: That is produced and available for use other than own fuel on the platform. Mr. Burrelis Then on.... other than platform fuel. Mr, Bates: Yes sir. Mr. Burrell: This is roughly 3.5 million cubic feet per day of gas pro- duced from the wells; Mr. Bates: That`s correct. The total platform production of gas is about five million a day. Mr. Burrell: Of which roughly 1.5 million is used as fuel. Mr. Bates: Yes sir. 1 have another exhibit which i will - - Mr. Burrell: I wasn't trying to get ahead of you, I was trying to get it sorted out. -9- • • Mr. Bates: I will go through these very quickly, this i hope wfiil help keep in focus with-where the numbers belong. Monthly oii production 32 degree APt gravity, 9,700 barrels per day. These are all 100 ~ figures and not Shell's one-third tugures. Mr. Burrell: Sir;:' would you identify this exhibit for the record. Mr. Bates: This is an exhibit which provides the premises Mr. Burrell: is this Shell's exhibit two? Mr,`'Bates: Yes sir. Mr. Burrell: Thank you Mr. Rudd: Weil mark them Mr. Burrell when we move to Mr. Burrell: Thank you Mr. Rudd, it will be marked Exhibit two. Mr. Bates: Our total platform gas production is five million cubic feet per day of which we burn the 1.5 million as fuel in the equipment. We have a gas lift capacity on this platform at 1100 psig of 12.5 million cubic feet per day. This is gas that is rotated on the platform for artificial lift. Our safety flare is .75 million, our sates gas compressor maximum capacity is si'x million a day. The average gas volume shipped to the beach has been running at 2.75 million. A value of the oil comes close to $3.30 a barrel. The value of the sale gas is 7d per mcf atieast. We're using the standard oil factor of 12.5 for royalty on the production. As 1 merit oned the second option allows us to ship gas to the beach and take a curtailment in production which we have calculated to be 1,200 barrels per day of oil. This oii-could be considered as either deferred car curtailed to a later time in :.the protect life or might possibly be lost oil or there _Ip- • • may be some proportional ratio between deferred and lost over the protect and platform life. Our option, our preference would be to take an option, even if we mus# invest additional capital to maintain production at the highest possible rate. Gas lift piping modifications to make possible ship- ing gas to the beach and thus reduce the flare volume has some inefficiences such as the fact that we must compress the gas to 1100 psi and then reduce the pressure back to the 250 psi platform discharge pressure. We must also recycle a portion of this gas back in to the gas susction system on the plat- form. As t mentioned earlier currently our gas sales compressor recycles gas back to the platform suction system to provtde the stable suction conditions. to the past the flare would. be allowed to vary back and for#h in cycle to take up the surges, and changes in conditions, in addition to the re-piping and work we would also require significant methanol infection or similar material to prevent freezing as we take the pressure drop from 1100 back down to 250 pounds. The significant oil produc- tion decrease results because of available high .pressure gas lift gas used for lifting production would be reduced. 4de've accumulated data from pre- vious gas lift compressor down time. This data indicates that production will be recovered only toward the end of the field life, estimated to occur in the range of (990 to (992, if ever. The possibilty of that this lost production will never be recovered exists since we are not certain that the remaining platform life will exist beyond its design of 20 to 25 years. This platform should be considered installed t believe in 1965. Our protect life limit then is matching the protect with platform life. i will have to admit and say that we do not know the exact reservoir characteristics and that's why l • will quite often qualify the difference between. lost or deferred oil. Our estimated cost to install these revisions in the piping are about $10,000 to provide pressure reduction and control equipment and this would take approx- imately two weeks for installation. in case i, with maximum oil production until the compressor is repaired, we are looking at a gross revenue of about $175, a day, that is the revenue from the gas sales, or over a month period $5,250 dollars. In case two, which would be to reduce the flare by 2.5 million a day which is equivalent to 3.4 billion btu's per day, we would have a result- ant loss in production of 1,200 barrels of oil per day or 6 billion btu's per day. The loss of daily income would be $4,000. and cost of operating. for the methanol would be $100. per day, or if a 30 day period this would amount to a loss of revenue of over $120,000. You will note that the STU content of the oil that l mentioned is six billion BTU's per day and this is #fie loss of 1290 barrels per day. Theis exceeds. the B1'U content of the gas which is ~.4 billion BTU's per day. Then 'this energy would either be deterred or lost till some later date. Also the State of Alaska stands to dose I/8tM of the $4,000 per day income or $500 per-day. The delay or even Toss ofi production at Middle Ground Shoal is possible it we curtail production or shut-in wells as I have mentioned. We provided data to dern- onstrate this in our March 4, 1971 hearing using deli C-22-26 to represent an le. This well is still producing at rates below its maximum rate. when we said water break through and had to increase gas lift capacity to the well. Of course this is interesting to bring this well back again to show that over a period: since 1971 this well which has shown watering out° -i2- • • and some damages, it still has not turned back to any original production rate. Our operating experience in this multi-layered field has sfaown that shut-in or curtailed production generally takes three months to recover, that is i# takes approximately three months for wells that are shut-in or curtailed by some manner to show the return to a stable production rate, generally at or below it's previous production rate. Generally our data is not totally conclusive, however there is strong evidence to show that some damage and lost production is caused by restricting or shuting-in this production. You may be aware that we recently shut-in five wells on Platform C to allow the sate drilling of a well through one of the legs. This shut-in from F~iay 22 to June ( resulted in production decrease from these wells from 5,945 barrels per day of oil to 4,555 barrels per day after re-start of the wells.. This is a decrease of 22~. Mr. Burrell: Excuse me, Mr. Bates, over what period of time was that you based your problem, the first ten days, the first 30 days? Mr. Bates: This decrease, the 4,655 barrels per day is what you would call the ini#ial rate for running the wells back. To date these wells have. recovered i/5th of this 22~ decrease in production. Mfe have extrapolated the data as near as we can from the start-up on June 1 and it indicates again that about 90 days will be required to achieve the production rate that we had prior to the shut-in. Mr: Burrell: .Again I don't mean to interrupt but your conclusion is that in 90 days you'll back to your previous Mr. Bates: Yes, our conclusion is that in 90 days we'll be back to the production rate that we were prior to shut-down. ;gain t must, often .. 13_: • • we don't get back entirely to the point, but we also in 90 days achieve a new stable rate, generally which is at or slightly below the previous rate. Another Weli 8-32-14 which was shut in becember fora pressure build-up test, this well was producing 875 barrels a day oil before it was shut-down. It has slowly recovered back to about 800 barrels per day of oil now and it is appearing to achieve a stable production rate at this time. This well returned back initially at 400 barrels per day, very rapidly increased to 600 and then has taken the period from the middle of January til! now to achieve the 800 barrel per day rate. in summary then, our recommends#ion is to continue to flare gas while the iu1GS platform A sates compressor is being repaired. We currently anticipate that the unit will be repaired and on the platform and operating in approxi- mately six weeks. This recommendation is based upon continuing production of about 1,200 barrels per day of oil which might be lost if curtailed or at best Production of which will be deferred several years. The following facts tend to support this recommendation. The flaring at this time is a result of an emergency equipment breakdown of the sales gas compressor. The energy con- tent of the o%I to be produced and quite possibly saved exceeds the. energy content of the gas to be flared by 2.6 billion BTU's per day. The loss of income of $4,000, per day,. of which the State of Alaska would receive $500. per day, exceeds the benefits in value of the gas to be saved; and fourth the curataiiment or shutting-in of production could damage the oil reservoir and/or the water flood process of supplemental recovery. That wif! conclude m~ presentation, i# #here are any questions, t would be pleased to answe r them. -14- • • Mr. Burrell: Thank you Mr. Bates. We'11 ask you or Mr. Rudd, would you rather have questions asked now or later? Mr. Sass: Now is fine. Mr. Rudd: [think i# might be appropriate to ask question of Mr. Bates-now. Mr. ~u rte I t " : ,I~ l ~-i g hi^F M r`:. Bates. Mr. Rudd: Okay, if I may at this point I'd like to move for introduc- tion of the two exhibi#s and make them part of the record. Mr. Burrell: Alright will you Mr. Rudd: twill mark Mr. Burrell: Were they prepared under the direction of Mr. Bates or fins supervision or something. Mr. Bates: They were provided underneath my supervision, by my staff. Mr. Burrell: They were provided by your staff. Mr. Bates: By my staff, under my supervision. Mr. Burrell: They will be labeled as Shell's Exhibit I and 2. Mr. Bates: Yes sir. Mr. Burrell: 1 would ask one question, Mr. Bates, before 1 turn it to other people. You mentioned an economic analyses of value of the oil, the value that you ,state. Mr. Bates: Yes sir. Mr. Burrell. Of oil, the other participants in what wellhead value do you use for this. Mr. Bates: I use the $3.30 per barrel. -I5- • • Per. Burrell: $3.30 per barrel. is that the value on which the royalty and severance tax is being paid. Mr. Bates: Yes sir, t believe it is. That is posted price. Mr, Burrell: You said the debt net recovery after the royalty and sever- ante tax? Mr. Bates: I believe it is i can not say i know it is but i believe fit is, Mr, Burrell: It is most interesting if you say it is another factor. Mr. Marshall do you have any questions? Mr. Marshall: I'd Just like to ask Mr. Bates, do you happen to have reduced copies of those Exhibits available. Mr. Bates: I have reduced copies of the second exhibit and i can have a reduced copy of the first one. t have the reduced copy, but it is very poor of the first exhibit. h9r. Marshall: We would appreciate these copies for our public avail- a6ili y folder. is Mr, Psichogios going to discuss the platform from the compressor problem in more detail, then you have? 1'4r. Bates: Yes sir, I would intend to have him present the say technology behind vibrations, some of the design features of high speed rotating equip- ment. Mr, Marshall: i'It defer my question till then. Mr. Bates: Okay. Mr. Marshall: Thank you Mr, Burrell: Mr. Giibreth? Mr, Giibreth: Mr. Bates, you mentioned that tests were carried out on -16- • same units operated by people other than your company in California, were these tests instituted as a result of the failure that you experienced or were they instituted prior to that? Mr. Bates: I believe that they were if they Mr. Psichogios: That's correct Mr. Bates: They had had a history, as 1 understand anyway, a history with these two units of trouble with one of the units, nothing comparing to what, comparable to what we have and the other unit which ran very well. When we requested Solar's assistance in analyzing the shaft vibration which we found in April, the first step was to go to these units and analyze the un-its which are quite similar to ours. t would say both to prove the system of analysis plus to have three units analyzed against one. fiAr. Gilbreth: So tar as you're able to determine from your operations here, are the operations under pressure from your A Platform and C Platform a,re incamprababie: Mr. Bates: Yes sir.tFiey're installed in a similar manner, they're the same type of condition, they're handling approximately the same volume of gas. The unit on Platform C does operate at slightly tower speed, its been' operating in the 86 to 88w of rated speed where the Platform A unit has been operating in the 88 to 90 or 91~ of rated speed. The prime difference is because of-the difference in gravity of the gas between the two platforms and the density of gas. Mr. Gilbreth: insofar as you are concerned then.., you have done every.- thing possible from your standpoint to minimize the problem. Mr, Bates: Yes sir, we have. The shaft or seal leakage problem is one which you would expect to find in equipment of this nature and was not until -17- • • April that we could really define or start to recognize a vibration pro- blem of some kind, at that time and we approached our supplier to help analyze. Mr. Giibreth: The Exhibit I you presented, did that show all of the down time on your compressor? Mr, Bates: Yes, the numbers at the bottom are all down time including down time for normal service such as tubing, or cleaning of parts or pieces or any of this type. Mr. Giibreth: You mentioned that your Well 8-32-14 goes down for a bottom hole pressure survey and i did not get the figures, t believe it was some- thing like 875 barrels peP day before, about 800 back to about 800 now. Mr. Bates: At this time, yes sir. Mr. Gilbreth: At this time. Did this well make water before it was shut- in or has it made water since that time? Mr. Bates: Just a minute while i - The weft is a 54~ cut well at this tame. Mr. Giibreth: Was it Mr. Bates: and t believe Mr. Gilbre#h: Was it a heavy water cut at the time it was shut-in? Mr. Bates: The cut has increased, before it was Shut-in, it was making about 37~ water. Before the shut-in it was making about 37~ water, after the shut~in period it was making slightly over 50~ and has recently shown some tncrease, I don't know if you could attribute this to clean-up or to additional productional rates at this time or not. Mr. Gilbreth: From an engineering point of view, do the extrapolation of either production rate vs cumulative curves or percent water cut curves show anything abnormal? Mr. Bates: They do from the viewpoint that this well took the radical _i8- • • Jump and the water cut performance prior to the shut--in had been at this approximately 37~ range for three months and very stable. After and on the very first test after initiation of production it was over 50`,!. Mr. Gilbreth: Has it ever dropped below 50~ since that time? Mr, Bates: f believe i# has once or twice at 49~, so very, very small below it. Mrs Gilbreth: Is this anything unusual that you would expect in any well making that amount of water if it were shut-in that way? Mr, Bates: t would expect almost any well that is producing very sign- ifi-cant amount of water if it were shut-in or sevorely curtailed, to show this type of phenomenon. We do have-data which indicates we have water which wfilt flow from one zone and back-flow to another. This data has been obtained by Spinner Surveys, a conventional technique used in the business, and we feel that in many of these cases this is what happens, that the water actually back flows from one zone into an another oil producing zone, then you must remove the water again, at least to the best of your ability. Mr. Giibreth: You testified that if the flaring were curtailed you would result in a loss of 1200 barrels of oil per day? Mr. Bates: Yes sir, if we ship the total volume of 2.75 million to the beach,, which is what we've been averaging, to maintain our safety flare, we would lose about 1,200 barrels per day of production. Mr. Gilbreth; Now in figuring this 1200 barrels per day did you assume that you would restrict only the water free wells or would it across the board deal or Mr. Bates: We assume that we would take the heaviest restriction on the poorest economic wells. We have -19- • • Mr. Gilbreth: The poorest economic wells Mr. Bates: We have a couple wells which are on the order of 40 to 50 barrels per day of oii running 50 to 90~ cut. We would stand a chance of losing those wells. t# those wells were on their own, they probably would not 6e commercial, however being they're on a platform with other wells they are commercial at this time. That is the type of well, that is one of the types of wells that we could lose. We did, in our analysis we were selective on the wells to do our best to minimize any potential damage. Mr. Gilbreth: Weil, I'd like to ask this question then, you figured it apparently selectively? Mr. Bates: Yes sir Mr. Gilbreth: Then how many of your .water producing wells would fail Tnto this category that you would restrict production on. i was wondering it the test were made only on water free welts would you, would you come up with about the same figures at a later-date? Mr. Bates: Only the water free wells? Mr`Gilbreth: Yes Mr. Bates: We'd probably come out much higher. We have a few wells which are very low cut that are very high volume producers, A-22-i is running about 2000 barrels, I'm sorry 14-I is running about 1900 barrels of oii and 6/10th of one `percent cut. Mr. Burrell: Excuse mef Mr. Bates, excuse me for interrupting, l didn't understand what you said a much higher what? Mr. Bates: tf the oii loss could be higher if we selectively curtailed production in the high oil producing wells with low cuts, as adverse to reducing production from the high cut low oil volume wells. -20- • • Mr. Gilbreth: Now, my next question then would be, do you have any evidence to show that delayed damage or reduction in productivity on a well that did not have a high water eut, have any of those been shut-in where you experiencing this? Mr. Bates: They have been shut-in, they do come back slowly, not as severly as a well which is making high volumes of water Mr, Gil6reth: But even those wells you're experiencing a reduction? Mr, Bates: Yes sir, we do not experience any large volume of increased production over the short period after start-up, then fall back to a normalized point you might expect in say a rod pumped wail where you would get what is called flush production, Mr, Gilbreth: Well, Mr. Bates, the reason I'm asking I've seen some curves on wells in Cook Inlet which were shat-in and on a rate-cumulative basis even though they don't come back to their original rate immediately, they do come back and show no permanent loss of production. I'm wondering if you have similar type information? Mr, Bates: Yes, we see wells of this nature also. They generally are''` the cleaner, better producers. Mr. Gilbreth: Yes, I Mrs Bates: And not the wet producers. Mr, Gilbreth: I'm of the opinion and I think a lot of others are that once you shut-in or restrict a large water producer yoa've got problems Mr. Bates: Yes sir. Mr` Giibreth: But until you started making it I wonder if you really;have a problem? 2I- • • Mr. Bates: Not as Beverly, ati we've seen is that you will defer that oil volume till some later date on it, on a very good well, that later date Is very hard to define, but it could be anything from a short period to several years. t think we find generally in operation that we're best if we can get our operation to some steady state and then make selective individual changes to the system rather then take a very large change to this system. When we are at steady state that we can analyze our well, we do get the opportunity to find those which are having erotic cuts in their production, we .have a chance to run surveys in the wells to determine whets going on down hole and take corrective action and then analyze the results. When we lose a compressor, gas lift system for instances there is a very drastic upset to the system and it throws you analysis on your process. I like to look at a water flood process like a chemical process in your refinery system where you try to get the system at some steady condition and then vary the individual single portion of the system. Mr. Gilbreth: You're constantly running surveys to detect thief zones,.and things like this. Mrs Bates: Yes sir. Mr. Gilbreth: Common to wells around here. Mr, Bates: Yes. N1R. Giibreth: Early in your testimony i understand, I understood you- to say that you anticipate repairs would be made two to three weeks from now, and then later in the testimony t understood you thought you'd be back in operation in six weeks. Mr Bates: Yes sir. Mr. Gilbreth: The three weekds in between is that for shipping and -22- • re-installing? • Mr. Bates: That's for shipping and re-installation and we plan to run this unit up through a test sequence on the start-up. We also have to re- check the gear box on the unit to make sure there's no damage in the gear box. We do have some repair work, probably to do in the out-board bearings. The out-put bearing of the unit. The difference in the two times is the ship- ing, which we intend to air-freight getting here to the platform, installing it, we run it through a series of tests to be sure that it is safe. if the vibration problem has been reduced or mitigated and then bringing the unit on the line. Mr. Gilbreth: I understood you to say that work underway would be to re-balance, among other things, did you suffer in this last mishap, did you suffer permanent damage to the case and things of this nature. Mr. Bates: I'ii refer the final part of that to Tom, however, the only damage that we have observed was that the rotating equipment or as we've observed on the platform in the seal and bearing areas, not in the case. Mr. Gilbreth: With the situation as it is now, are you able to move any gas to shore? Mr. Bates::-.At this point. h9r. Gilbroth: Any gas that is already committed. Mr. Bates: At this time, no, we are not without modifying our gas lift system. Mr. Gilbreth: Are you taking all of your gas lift output then to use as a system, none of it going to shore? -23- • • Mr. Gates: T~Spt is true. The excess which is the 2,75 we normally ship, to the volume that would be flared plus the .75 safety flare volume and our gas lift system is operating at full capacity in artificial lift work. Mr. Gilbreth: Do you have no excess capacity then? M r. Hates: Plo sir, we don't. Mr. Glbreth: That's ail I have right now. Mr. Burrell: Thank you, Mr. Marshal) do you have any questions? Mr, Marshall: No Mr. Burrell: I think we'll have several questions here and it doesn't mean you're through, until after Mr. Psichogios. Mr. Bates: Very good. Mr. Burrell: Thank you Mr. Bates. Mr, Bates: Thank you. Mr. Burrell: ©on't leave. Mr, Bates: 1 won't, 1 don't have a flight till late tonight. Mr. Burrell: Mr. Psichogios would you state your qualifications sir. Mr, Psichogios; Yes, I'll do that in form of an introduction here. My name is Tom Psichogios and I am a Mechanical Engineer, wi#h a broad lack- ground in mechanical analysisp specializing in rotor high speed dynamics. I received my BSME degree from General Motors Institute in 1956, For the past twelve years I've been employed by the Solar IJivision of the International Harvester and t am presently in charge of the mechanical group responsible for stress vi~ratton relating to all company product lines. f'm also a mem- her of the ASME, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and 1'`ve authored and published several papers on high speed bearing and roter dynamics. That -24- • • in sum is my qualification and further this morning after I'm sworn to i would like to describe the compressor mechanical drive system to the Committee so they have a full understanding of the equipment we're talking about and its configuration. Air. Burrell: We need that - so I'II ask Mr. Marshall to swear you in - without exception your qualifications are accepted as an expert witness. Mr. Marshall: Please raise your righ hand. The matter now at hearing, do you swear to tali the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God? Mr. Psichogios: Yes, I do. 1+~s t~lar~sha I~C : `Yost may t~e'`seated. Mr. Rudd: Mr. Burrell, would it help if we moved the board up closer to the table? Mr. Burrell: Yes, it sure would, only because we can't see it. Mr. Psichogios: Th7s exhibit illustrates the mechanical drive system in half-scale SL. Now the basic parts of the system that we'll be looking at this morning,: we have our solar turbine driving in at 22,300 rpm, through a" coupling into the full gear of the Western gear box. This is the Western gear box that was purchased by Solar, its a model 31-03 and it takes the 22,300 rpm output speed of the turbine, power turbine, and it increases the speed up to 22 - 24,282 rpm and now the entire high speed drive train rotates at 24,282 rpm at 100 design speed, The output from the high speed pinion of 'the Wes- tern gear box is supported in these two bearings which we will refer to from now on in as the forward bearing and the-aft bearing. The Western gear in turn is connected to the input of the compressor which is shown on the far end here - the York model 725 7 stage centrifugal compressor and its _25- • • connected to a York-plea i ~C inch coupling. Now the coupling co~ises of ~e~ a flexible element here in this..location and a long slender shaft which rs_ about an finch in diameter which we refer to as the q,u,fili shaft, Now- the purpose of the coupling is cater to misalignments in the system. The fiex- able elemen# will cater to angular mis-alignments and the long quill shaft will cater to the laterial mis-alignments, in other words, it the center 11ne of the compressor doesn't line up exactly with the high speed pinion then that mis-alignment will be taken up in this long slender shaft. if there is an .angle between the center line of the York compressor and the center line of the high speed pinion, then that mis-alignment is taken up in this flexible coupling. Now in turn this flexible coupling is made up essentially of two very slender flat discs of about five inches in diameter and they're allowed Just the flex to take the angular mis-alignment. Now the, when Solar was notified that there seemed to be a vibration problem on the horizon, we sent a man up to the Platform A, along with a Western gear representative and a York representative and we did this in order to have ail concerned parties on site to-witness the vibration that" was taking place and to try to come to some agreement as to where the vib-~' ration might be emanating from and how it might best be fixed. The initial data that came off of the Platform on operation of the unit indicated that vibration levels on the cases of the compressor as well as the gear box were really not too indicative of what was going on in the rotor system, So the only step that was left was to observe the vibration that was taking place on this long slender-quill shaft and this was. done by means of a stroboscope Jight which was tuned to the rotational speed of the quill and by that means -26- • • you could observe the motion of that quit! and the characteristic that was found was that at 9fl~ everything seemed to be quite stable, but upon reducing the speed beyond 90~ up to 92, 94 or 95~ a notica6te width occured in the quilt-shaft.. tt was largest at the center of the quill and then seemed to die off as you went towards the Western gear box and the same thing occured on the other end, it seemed to die off as you went towards the York can- pressor.. So in observing that the first conclusion that everybody came to was. that there was a problem in the York coupling as this shaft was too long and too slender, however this had been analyzed previously and it was deter- mined previously that that in fact was not the case, that shaft was large enough in diameter and it was short enough to preclude any critical speed of that coupling shaft on its own. However, it was still not completely agreed to, by Western Gear representative, they felt there were still problems in the York coupling and York likewise felt #here was a problem ;back in the gear box, that was finding its way back into the compressor shaft. 5o with- in the limitations of the instrumentation that was available there was no way to accuractely determine the motion of the quill-shaft along its tengtM without resorting to some more exotic instrumentation, so the only infor- motion we had at that point was with regard to whet was observed with the_ strob and ail we learned from that was there was a speed at which the vib-- ration seemed to emanate as a motion in the quill-shaft and I guess the quill shaft was really taking that form Itke that, and it seemed to be agravated with speed. So at this. point having gone as far as we could with all the three representatives on the platform, it was decided. to embark a rotor dy~ ~~ namics study whereby you would simulate the high-speed rotor system in our -27- • • computer program to determine critical speed of the entire system. And by that means what we hoped to do was to vary all the variables we could in the system and attempt to analytically produce the same sort of phenomenon which was occurinv in the actual hardware. Mr. Burrell: Mr. Psichogios, the three representatives on the platform were, Solar Division of International Harvester, Western Gear Box, and York. Mr. Psichogios: That's correct. Mr, Burrell. ThanCt you. Mr. Psichogios: You might point that there was also Mr. Burrell: t can't hear you. Mr. Bates: I'd like to point out at this time, there was also an independent party hired by Shell as Consultant, who witnessed the test. in general, his opinion was the same as the people representing the suppliers, that is, that there was something in here that could not clearly define what they had and he was at, not a loss, but he could not define clearly where he thought the vibration was. Mr. Burrell: At that time the."guilty" party had not been determined. Mr. Bates: That's true, that's right, we hired a third party because we felt a third party which did not have an interest of Shell or the supplier, would be in the best .position to determine whether Shell, one of the suppliers or all of the suppliers might be the one causing the problem. Mr. Burrell: Thank you. Mr. Psichogios: As 1 mentioned the analytical rotor dynamic study was initiated to more or less shed some more sight on what might have been going on and attempt to pin-point where the problem might 6e emanating from. What we have on the bottom exhibit here are two -28- • • Mr. Burrell: Excuse me, for identification, can we identify the top one as Shell Exhibi# 3 and the bottom, as Shell Exhibit 4. Mr. Psichogios: Very good. We're showing the motion of the shaft at a speed of 20,947 rpm, that results when the bearing spring rate in the gear box was lowered to a value of about 500,000 pounds per inch, which corresponds to bearings with fairly large clearances in them. That was arbitrarily done to see what eftect it would have on the system and the excursion of the system resulted as we show in the dotted itne here. We show a very large excursion some where near the center of quill shaft with the vibration dying off in either direction. So that seemed to fit what we were seeing on the platform. We were able to show a enlarged vibration occuring at the quill shaft and that resulted from a critical speed which manifested itself in the gear box. And i# would show up if you had high clearance in the bearings and resulting low bearing spring rate. That was the first correlation we found in our analytical model and what we found on the platform. Now the second thing that was done arbitrarily was to do the same sort of thing in the bearings of the compressor, we arbitrarily said okay if we had large clearances in the compressor bearings and corresponding low beai~- ings spring rate what might happen to the dynamics of-the system, and the bottom curve again shows the same sort of characteristcs, to show the ampii- tude of the rotor along its li#e as you go from the gear box through the quial shaft and back into-the compressor and again we're looking at the black curve. We show a fairly large amplitude, showing up somewhere near the center of the quill shaft, with the amplitude dying off in either direction. So we had,two cases now that we could point to, we could say if we had large clearances in -29- ~~ • these bearings of the gear box, we could possibly have critical speed that would cause the quill shaft to vibrate, and essentially what happening is if the gear, if the gear pinion is vibrating in this fashion and you have an amplitude forced at that end of the system, then the quill shaft is essen- tially Just Jumping rope, you can, you can envision that slender quilt Just going like that, and the same situation exists here. If the compressor forces an amplitude to occur here then the quill shaft is only, as it will be excited in the same fashion, only from the opposite end. So these were two likely cases that offered an explanation as to what was going on. Now as was men- tioned previously there was an attempt to design some bearings with low clea- rances in them and tie them to the gear boxes in an attempt to hopefully reduce the vibration that was occuring in the quill shaft. Now this was done in the ill-fated test where we had the failure. We did apply the post clearance bearings and then we ran to 9g~, the vibrations seemed to be somewhat reduced, an attempt was made to heat up the unit and then we suffered a failure. Now before I get into that area, i'Il get back to it, i would like to go on and discuss the next step after we finish the analytical model to kind of point the direction that we might look in to Melp you find what was going on in the system, and that next step was to apply more extensive instrumentation. Now during the interim period from when we had Western supply us with close clearance bearings, and the time it was tested, we designed a series of proximity probes and brackets which would mount on the present system and would allow us to put non-contact probes in various locations along the part that was showing the vibrations. Now again, we're switched around here, we're showing the compressor shaft on this end with the long quill shaft here, here's the flexible element and the coapling, which then screws in the gear shaft which is corresponding to that location. -3~- • • Mr. Burrell: Excuse me, Mr. Psichogios, let the record reflect that we are now looking at what would be i presume Shell's Exhibit 5. Mr. Psichogios: Very good. Mr. ~urrrsl°I'~ . " ` Thank you. Mr. Psichog~©s: In our instrumentation brackets we're able to bolt a plate on to the compressor that allow two probes to be placed in this location one probe into the vicinity of the center of he quill:shaft:and also one probe on the OD of the flex element coupling to monitor what excurision it was under- going, and as was mentioned previously, this instrumentation was fabricated very quickly and on the way up to the platform. It was decided again since we suffered a failure on platform A of the close clearance bearing machine, that since we had the instrumentation ready to go we would put this instrumentation on Plat#orm C, and monitor the help of that Unit so to speak and find out wFiat vibrations, if any, occured on that Unit and along with that plan we also were able to schedule onto a platform in Santa Barbara channel on Sun Oii to look at the two units which are very similar to this high speed unit. The only differences they have one more stage in the compressor. The gear box, the coupling and the compressor are identical, except they have one more stage on the compressor and it was felt that small difference really would not reflect itself in what we were looking for. So once we had the instrumen#a- tion we were able to look at two units in the Santa Barbara Channel, on gun Oil Platforms and then we proceeded last week, last Wednesday and Thursday, we were able to monitor the characteristics of P''i'atform C. Now we do have c}uite a bundle of data which we're still in the process of analyzing but what t'd like to present now, are the highlights of what we've found so far, and these highlights are really presented in these vib- -31- • • ration traces which were derived from the proximity probes, mounted now on the Platform C Unit, and the characteristics we see on the Platform C Unit were very similar to the two units we saw in Santa Barbara. Mr. Burrell: Excuse me, Mr. Psichogios, how many of those do you propose to exhibit? Mr, Psichogios: I have four of these, these are the only copies I have, what we'll have to do is introduce them as exhibits, would be to make some xerox copies, if that would be acceptable. Mr. Burrell: I see. It would be one, two, three, four so far? Mr. Psichogios: That's correct. Mr. Burrell: This would be five, six, seven, eight Mr. Psichogios: Five is the Mr. Burrell: Five on top of it, I'm sorry, six seven, eight, nine Mt'. Psichogios: Five, six, seven, eight, nine. Five through nine. Mr. Burrell: Would you identify them before termination of this hearing? Mould you identify Exhibit 6 through 9, and provide us with xerox copies? Mr. Psichogios: Yes sir Mr. Burrell: Thank yoa. Mr, Psichogos: This vibration trace is showing speed across the bottan going from 10~ all the way up to 100. On the vertical scale, which is a log scale we're showing the amplitude as measured by proximity probe ,~I, which was placed as close to the compressor in-put shaft as we could get it within the confines of the configuration. The trace shows the excursion in this location as the speed is increased, and you see we go along here quite flat, we're looking at I mil here and 10 mils up at the maximum point and that would be IO,000th peak to peak that would be total excursion. We start off in the taw speed rate with a very long excursion come up to about 10,400 rpm. and -32- • • notice a sharp rise, we peak out, come back down, then in the upper speed range we're showing a very sharply rising characteristic as we approach 100 and we're looking at something on the order of about 5 rniis peak to peak vib- ration as measured at that location. Now we have a corresponding trace in the next Exhibit. Mr. Burrell; Let the record reflect that we're moving from Shell Exhibit 5 to Shell Exhibit 6. Mr. Marshall; Pardon me, f think we're on the wrong Mr. Psichogios: Six to seven. Mr, Burrell; Six to seven Mr. Psichogios; Yes, we're looking at seven right now. Mr. Burrell: Steel) Exhibi# 6 and Shell Exhbit 7, very good. Mr. Psichogios: Now on Exhibit 7, we're showing the output from the proximity probe located at the center of the quill shaft, which was really the point of most interest since our strobe data was taken at that location or we had a reference to that location. Now we see a very similar characteristic again, we're looking at the t0 mil maximum on the vertical scale and we're looking at speeds for 10 to 100 again. We show the same sort of peak going through the first compressor critical speed at 10,400, we come out of. that speed, we (suet off and then in the high speed range again we're showing a sharp rise in characteristics. On Exhibit 8, we're looking at the corresponding output, at this location number 4, which is on the flex element of the York coupling. Now in this case we see a fairly flat characteristic, we do not peak out in the region where we had previously encountered the critical speed in the compressor, that peak is now absent. However we do go into a peak at a slightly higher speed,. and this speed corresponds to about 19,800 and that speed again comes- :..: -33- • • ponds to a speed very close to where we calculate a critical speed in the Western gear pinion shaf#, the high speed pinion. Then after you go through that critical you have a characteristic where the vibration drops down at this location. Now one other interesting phenomenon that we noted on Exhibit No. 9, which again is at location number 4 which is on the flc element. These two traces are for the same set of data, the only difference between these two is all this vibration is at rotor speed, in other words corresponds, as the speed increases, we're looking at the vibration amplitude at that particular speed as we''re going up. Now this trace looks at the overall vibration, in other words its measures the amplitude at all frequencies that are felt at that location, and on this trace again we do note that there is peak in the region of this critical speed and ail of a sudden out here we get the peak where the critical speed of the Western gear is encountered and then later on we'll encounter an another peak, and that. peak, the difference between these two peaks is exactly this gear ratio, and the thing that is occuring is, the un- balence"in the low speed gear is thumping the high speed gear and excifiing"the critical speed again, so we encounter the critical speed of the high speed pinion at 19,800 rpm which occurs at that peak and then later on at 21,300 which is that peak, so we have one other clue here that apparently there is a fair amount of unbalance in that low speed gear on the Western gear and its something to be very careful about in the future though that we check very carefully the balance in within the required drawing tolerance. Now again, comparing back to the information that we have derived from our analytical model where we said when we were able to duplicate or to achieve this kind of characteristic whereby the critical speed of the compressor was -34- • • causing the York coupling shaft to bow, we can take this data which I've plotted from probe number I, probe number 3 and probe number 4, and t can come up with this red line to show you the correlation we get between, predicted from the analytical model and what we actually measured on Plat- form C at these three locations. So there's a point there, there's a point there and there's a point there, and now if I paired that in you can see there is a pretty fair agre®ment between what the analytical model says it could be and what we actually measured, so we feel fairly certain that at least at that particular speed the quill shaft is being excited by a crit- [cal speed in the gas compressor and further that that critical speed is lower than it should be because the bearing clearance is probably larger than it should be. So that would point us in that direction in terms of being able to get that critical speed up and out of the range. Again I mentioned that in the interim period we were able to monitor the two Sun Oit Units in Santa Barbara prior to doing the Platform C Unit and t've got a summary here which shows the highlights again of that data. At probe location number I, which is at the input of the compressor Sun Oil Unit I shows 3 # mil peak to peak. Mr. Burrell: Excuse me, Mr. psichogios, are we, Mr. Psichogios: This will be Exhibit 10. Mr. Burrell: Weil reflect, we're now discussing Exhibit 10? Mr. Psichogios: Right. Mr. Burrell: Thank you. Mr. Psichogios: Our probe number ( on the Sun 0ii Number I Unit was 3 ~ thousandths, Sun Oil Unit number 2 was 5 ~ thousandths, some-what higher, -35- ~ • Shell Platform C was 4 ~ thousandths, some where in between #hese two limits. Probe number 3, which is at the mid-span of the quill shaft, Sun Oil number I, was 4 ~ thousandths, Sun Oil number 2 was 7 ~ thousandths, again higher than Unit i, and Shell Platform C was again in between about 7 thousandths peak to peak. At this .location at the flex element, probe number 4 on Sun Oil number I showed about } thousandths very small. Vie did not get data on Unit number 2 on Sun Oii and Shell Platform C again was about a mil, sltghtiy larger than the Sun Oii unit was. Now the history of Sun Oii Unit number I, has had no history of failure what so ever, it has 2,300 hours of trouble free operation, with- out any down time what so ever. 1 can't document that, but we can do that in the future if its required. Shell Unit number 2 did have some problems with seals in the compressor. They had sane wear in the compressor seals and a loss In performance and subsequently that unit was torn down to bring back up the performance. Other than that it has not suffered any mechanical problems. Sheii Platform number C, of course has had a rather high utilization that was indicated for the record previously, and it does give you some indication now fif you measure with proximity probe information and you .know the absolute motion occuring along the high speed system, that you have some measure of success here with regard to correlating back to reasonable values back in the area of the quill shaft. Now from the strobe late, of course we couldn't get any quantitative .data, ail we had was qualitative data and we had esti- mates any where from 35 mils to 70 mils motion at 1-hat location. Just to . give you a feel for what that comparison was to what~wetre measuring here, we're measuring in the highest case here, about 7 ~ mils, 7-mils on the Platform C Unit compared to what was indicated on Platform !~ Unit of 35 to 70 mils. -36- This remains an area for future study to, we did not have a strobe light when we did this test on either the Santa Barbara units or the Platform C Unit, but the next time we do run a test we'll have the strobe light and we will make a ccxnparison between what you can visually see with-the strobe light and what a more precise instrumentation is able to give you. So, really, the net result of this study was to show that we probably have a somewhat marginal system in terms of having everything in the high speed. drive range be right..:...:.>There could 6e two things that would go astray, three things possibly, when it comes to balance that might lebd you into trouble. One other thing t might mention in going back to Exhibit 6 - 7, which showed the excursions at the center of the quill shaft, we did operate this unit to over- speed shut-down, to make sure that in the event the unit did undergo an over speed shut-down that the unit would be safe and we operated up to 103 speed, and i penciled in the excursions that were measured at 103 speed. and-it amounted to II mLis peak-to-peak at that location and again it Just accentuated that rising characteristic as if we were coming into a critical speed in this area. Before t summarize, t guess the next thing we ought to talk about is the failure of the unit when we ran it on Platform A with the closer clear- ance bearings. As we noted previously, the closer clearance bearings were an attempt to try to minimize the vibration that might be felt at the quill shaft in the event that the critical speed of the Western gear box high speed pinion was in fact the contributor, or was in fact the phenomenon that was exciting the quill shaft, so in an attempt to quickly get an answer to that Western gear did fabricate some bearings that were about 3-~ mil clearance which ended up being about a mil and ~ smaller than they normally use and they supplied the bearings to us and they were installed into the gear box very quickly. There was a check made on the balance on the high speed pinion, the -37- • • low speed pinion was not checked ofr balance however, in that build up. The unit was re-aligned, the coupling was checked, there was not any work done as far as I know on the compressor, it was operated as it was, prior to the installation of the close clearance bearings in this area. upon start-up of that unit a 90~, again qualitatively, the operators indicated they did feel there was sane improvement in terms of observing the center stand of the quill at 9096 speed with the close clearance bearings as opposed to the stan- dard larger clearance bearings. The unit was going to operate there to the point where the conditions would stabilize and in the period of 20 minutes we suffered a catastrophic failure. It appears as if there was a seizure of the seal in the compressor area, which is mounted on the end of the quill shaft, better seen up here. This is the compressor right in this area. It appeared as if that seal seized and caused a reverse torque on the quill shaft which caused it to begin unscrewing in the compressor shaft. This quill is screwed into the end of the oomp~essor shaft and a reverse torque on it would cause it to unscrew. if the torque is in the normal driving direction it would tend to tighten that thread, so a reverse torque was applied to the quill shaft, it started to unscrew but sinced the shaft was turning at sanewhere around 22,000 at 90~ speed it did not take very long to begin backing out and in backing out and unscrewing from the compressor shaft it had nowhere to go, its going to fare all the drive frame back towards the gear to push in that direction and the first thing that would happen, you would tend to squeeze theses flexible elements together, there's no room for this to go, it's Just going to push with this tremendous load, and it would fail these rather flex- lble plates very quickly and in further unscrewing, since it has no more room -38- • • to push anything, everything would go solid, the only thing that would happen is that this shaft would tend to buckle out like that and tend to squirt out sideways, and when it did #hat, it failed this coupling completely, and we lost this portion of the coupling. The shaft, the quill shaft r~nained intact,. it was kind of frozen rota the seal, and this shaft was bent up an that side, about like that. The quill shaft itself stayed intact, it didn't fracture it just remained bent. This portion did come loose from the rotating assembly, however, in looking at the damage on the outside of the coupling, made out of aluminum, there was very little damage on it, there were a couple of dents in it, however around the periphry there was very little damage indicating that when it came off it wasn't rotating at a very high speed, it was going fairly slow. This portion of the compressor hit the enclosure and remained inside the enclosure. On disassembly, apparently the gear box is free, there is no, the bearings in the gear box were pounded out; they had not failed as extensively as previous bearings had failed on other failures. The compressor main bearing, the forward and the aft bearing showed signs of scoring the journal, but again there wasn't much sign of very high heat build up, so it was apparent that those bearings had not precipitated a failure. The seals throughout the compressor were rather heavily scored, indicating the motor was under- going some rather severe excursions, and again 1 would say probably this phen- omenon when we were up in the high speed end of the response curve here, where we had considerable motion accuring there that caused that whiten- ing action and finally failed the seal in this area which finally seized up. Again our initial feed back is that the closer clearance bearing did help improve things, but again we do not have quantitative information to support that. _39_ • • So in summary, realty our feeling is that in tight of these three units that we're able to monitor with our extensive instrumentation in terms of proximity probes that these three units have exhibited fairly good service life and we would feel that the problem on Platform A would come from some extenuating circumstances which we think we may have pinned down and these boil down to three. The bearings in the gear box having excessive clearance;:the bearings to the compressor having excessive clearance; or balance in the compressor or turbines, or gear box sections being at fault, or contributing high toads. So those are the three things we would look in the Platform A Unft as being cul- prits so to speak as to why that particular unit does not fare as well as the other two units we talked about here. So our recommended course of action arould really fall into two categories, one would be a short range approach, whereby we would re-build the unit in its present configuration, Solar would retain very close control over the re-build of the unit, again we would look very closely at the things I mentioned, balance in the gear box, both the high speed and the low speed gear, proper alignment of the coupling and fit up of the coupling, precise balance of the compressor and control of the clearances both in the gear box and in the compressor and we would add the .instrumentation that we-spoke about here. In terms of proximity probes on .the re-build of the unit, we would very carefully monitor the start-up of the unit, determine the quality of the build, in terms of the excursions, and since we do have a,measure of where they have to be to provide adequate service rife, we do have a good handle on where we have to put those excursions and we would not operate the unit at high speed unless of course we did Mave a clean. bill of health for the unit. -40- • The other thing we're. thinking about is to permanently install a probe at the mid-span location number three, as part of the assembly and this would serve as a multi-purpose probe.First it would be an alarm when it reaches a certain value it wcwid sound an alarm to give you a warning and then second- ly at a slightly higher excursion it would be a positive shut-down of the unit, not allowing it to operate beyond a certain speed or certain vibration level. Now our engineers and our instrumentation people are looking at this and does look feasible and it is a system we use on other production equip- ment. We build our gas compressors with these types of probes in them and it looks Tike it will be a viable system. So that would take care of the short range program to get the platform A back into operation as soon as possible. Now the other course of action would be more of a long range program and it would go on concurrently with the short range program but would be a longer Lead type of action and this would involve first the final review of all the vibration data with the other people involved, our vendors, Western Gear and the York Compressor people. Now, we have already made provisions to start send- ing in some of the data we've looked at here and in fact they will receive a complete set eventually and we'll review these and give them our assesment of the system of variables and indicate to them the. possible areas where we feel the system can be improved and it will be up to them to take these recommen- dations and take some action on them along with our assistance. And again,... these areas would hopefully not change the system drastically and result in> excessive lead time. We would hope to make as small a change as is engineer- ing feasible and put the system in amore desirable ~integerity standpoin#. Then finally, if we can get agreement with. our vendors, then we would incor-. porate these design changes, arrange to have a re-test with the proper -4 I - ~ • instrumentation and make an assesment of what and any changes that might take place in this re-design effort. So we feel that these two actions running concurrently would not only get Platform A back into operation but in the long run would hopefully improve all units of this configutation. That pretty much concludes my statements here. Mr. Burrell: It's i1:00 ociock, Mr. Psichogios, i think we'll take a ten minute break. Mr. Psichogios: Very good. Mr. Surrell: We'd like to ask you some questions after that. Mr. Ps i chog i chs : Very good Mr. Burrell: Thank you. Mr. Burrell: We'II reconvene this hearing now. Mr. Rudd: Mr. Burrell, you might at this time Mr. 8urreli: Mr. Rudd, yes Mr. Rudd: At this times have the witness identify the Exhibits. Mr. Burrell: Yes, if he would identify as his work product also. Mr. Rudd: Mr. Psichogios: during your presentation you referred to Exhi- bits three through ten. Were all those Exhibits prepared by you or under your supervision. Mr. Psichogios: Yes, all Exhibi#s three through ten were personalty pre- pared by myse i f . Mr. Burrell: Thank you, Mr. Psichogios, we'll accept them:°inta the record, thank you Mr. Rudd. Mr. Psichogios, i have one question for you sir, which is a rather large question but and I know you covered it but what I'm really looking for is kind of a summary of the thing. What is the dif- ference between the mechanical and or operating procedures of Platform C -42- • • and Platform A that causes this problem which we're faced with on Platform A anal not on Piatfiorm C? Could you Just briefly state what those are sir?. ' Mr. Psichogios: Yes, i think that was touched upon when Dick Mr. Burrell: it was Mr. Psichogios: When Dtck was mentioning the: difference between the two units and he did mention that Platform C was operating at lower speeds, 86 to 88%. Mr. Burrelic Right, is that the only reason in your opinion sir for the problem on A as opposed to no problem on C? Mr. Psichogios: That could be a substantial contribution in terms of the unbalanced forces which are felt. if you look at any of those Exhibits four through or six through nine you'll note the very sharply rising char- acteristic as you do go up in speed and its that sort of thing that would aggravate the vibration characteristics. However, our feeling is that there was something more than that involved in the Platform A unit. P4r. Burrell: i detected that and I'm trying to fish it out, its not "' my Job to allocate responsibility between the various c:ontractors,=however Mr. Psichogios: Yes Mr. Burrell: however, I want that very clear for the record. Mr. Psichogios: i think we've pin-pointed this in terms of the critical factors that would possibly cause the sort of vibration characteristics that we did see and .again Just mentioning briefly those were the balanced condition in the gear box,:the balanced condition in the compressor, the alignment, which will assume is done properly, again its another factor that enters in, and all of these things i think have #o really be pin-pointed before you can really thoroughly answer that question, -43- • • Mr. Burrell: i suspect it will be explored in greater detail then this Committee will today. Mr. Psichogios: Very much so. Mr. Burrell: Mr. Marshall, ~ you have any questions? Mr. Marshall: One small question, Mr. Psichogios. On your. Exhibits six through nine, you mentioned, you used the term critical speed. Mr. Psichogios: Yes Mr. Marshall: Now is this the shaft speed, at tets~>say maximum excursion of that shaft or could you explain that briefly please. Mr. Psichogios: Okay now, let me define it this way. If you speak of a critical speed, let's take a simple case where you have our old familar beam supported at each end. Now if you were to pluck that or impact the beam it would vibrate at a certain frequency freely and that we refer to as a natural frequency. Now if that beam were round and rotating, if you were to rotate that beam at its natural frequency then you would have a critical speed. Again that beam has a certain natural frequency, we're going to begin rotating it at that very same frequency, the inherent unbalance on that shaft is going to cause it to vibrate very violently. if you sat at that speed very precisely, it would begin wipping very violently and build up until finally it could go into failure if it stayed there. So that's what we refer to as a critical speed. Mr, Marshall: Thank you. That's ail the questions I have. Mr, Burrell: Mr. Giibreth? Mr. Gilbreth; Mr. Psichogios mentioned a series of tests that were run on Shell Platform C and also at Santa Barbara, I think your Exhibits cover three such installations. Are these the only installations for this particular type of equipment that you have? -44- • • Mr. Psichogios: My understanding is that we have a #otai of thirty. Mr. Giibreth.: t see Mr. Psichogios: gear boxes that have been supplied or will be supplied very shortly by Western Gear, however, ail of these units are not of the same speed, some are lower speed, some are the same and some are consid- erably lower in terms of maybe 16 to 18,Og0 rpm output. Mr. Giibreth: Then are these the only three that are comparable to Shell Platform A? Mr. Psichogios: i believe there are three other units that are located, one is U Texas and two are in the Gulf Coast applications, down in Louisana, t think there are three other ones. Mr. Giibreth: To the best of your knowledge are problems like these existing in any of the other installations? Mr. Psichogios: I can't answer that affirmly. Mr. Giibreth: I'm wondering if this particular problem is it mostly unique on Shell Platform A and i believe some mention was made of a problem in Santa Barbara. Mr. Psichogios: To my, to the best of my knowledge that is tru®. i only have knowledge of the Santa Barbara units and the Platform A and C units. That's been my involvement. Mr. Giibreth: I see. On your Exhibit 8, I'm Just curious, there's a sudden reversal there in the curve, I can't even read the rpm reading or anything, but what causes something like that, that sudden reversal? You've got z~piitude going down and it immediately goes up. Mr. Psichogios: Okay that occurs because of a phase shift within the.. rotor system prior to going through a critical speed, that's the best way i -45-- C can answer that. t can try to give you more detail if you like. Mr. Gilbreth: That's good enough.. Mr. Psichogios: It's a phenomenon we've seen in other cases and the reason you see it on that trace is because you'll notice that the low speed, the amplitude is still quite high, indicating there is a fair amount of low speed run~out in that area to begin with and we've noted that phenomenon before. if those other traces had higher displacements at low speed, you'd have seen this sort of thing occur there Mr. Gilbreth: I see. On the test that you were running on Platform A, at the time it was left unattended to warm up did you have to have a constant speed control on the equipment at that time? You were running a test at a certain rpm, as I understood the testimony and then left it to warm up. Could the equipment itself have increased speed. Mr. Psichogios: i was not personally in attendance on this test but I understand the turbine was set on manual control, indicating that its not very likely that the speed would have gone up. Mr. Gilbreth: i see. Mr. .Psichogios: The initial reports were that there was in fact sane sort of speed increase, but apparently its been confirmed that the unit was on manual control and that most likely would not have suffered a speed in- crease or undergone a speed increase. Mr. Gilbreth: Now, from your testimony and that of Mr. Bates, we under- stand that there has been some damage done here and that the equipment at least some of it is being re-manufactured or re-turned or re-sized, is the earliest that the equipment could be placed in operation, making the necessary. repairs, this three weeks that we heard a while ago. is that what the present schedule calls for? icc ask that. -46- • • Mr. Psichogios; As of yesterday that was my understanding, that was the best date it could be achieved with expediting parts through York and that was their appraisal as to when they might be able to deliver their compressor rotor to us. Mr. Gilbreth: Okay is, is that the controlling factor, Yorks delivery of the compressor rotor to you? is there any problem in the Western Gear Box hook up. Ms. Psichogios: The bearings will have to be replaced. Mr. Gilbreth: Will they be ready by that time? Mr. Psichogios: Yes, the bearings would offer no problem, however, we had not up to the present time looked at the gear to ascertain whethe r there is any re-work that might be required there. I would assume that there would not be any modification and if any would be minor and we would rely. on Western Gear to give us their apprasal of that equipment prior to our using. it any further. Mr. Burrell: Excuse m® Mr. Gilbreth, gust interrupt one second on this point and I'ii turn it back to Mr. Gilbreth. Do I understand that you may have to look into other components other than the York, in which you haven't done anything yet and you may, six weeks may run and_get your Yark gear or York compressor in and find out it's not fixed yet, and then start another period of time? Mr. Psichogios: No Mr. Burrell: Is time running concurrently? Mr. Psichogios: No, the period while we're waiting for the York hard- ware would certainly be used to prepare the rest of the system and make sure -47- • that there weren't any lead items in the assembly, so between now and the when we receive the York, we'll certainly know the condi#ion of the rest of the system and have that pretty well in hand. So my feeling is there won't be any other lead items other than the York compressor and coupling. Mr. Burrell: Mr. Giibreth. Mr. Giibreth: t'd like to ask one final question. In the handling of this problem, is there anything that your people or the York people could have done to expedite the solution of this that hadn't been done, or is the r® ,, any thing that Shell could have done to accelerate the solution of this that . ,. hasn't been done? Mr. Psichogios: I would say no, Judging from my involvement as of last May, from the beginning of May and looking back on the history and the se- quence of events that took place and all the information that had to be com- plied before we got to the point where we are now and knowing whats involved now, well I could reai`ly see no short cut to getting to the same point where we are now any sooner. Mr. Giibreth: That's nit I have. Mr. Burrell: Mr. Marshall, do you have any further questions? Mr. Marshall: tdo further questions. Mr. Giibreth: l'd like to ask if Mr. Rudd is going to summarize I have another question or so. Mr. Rudd: i intend to summarize Just very briefly. Mr. Burrell: :Before Mr. Rudd summarizes I will~ask if there is anybody in the audience who would like to be heard on this matter, this is a public hearing, if you like to make a statement, if you would like to ask a question -48- • • of any of the witnesses or testify or anything else. Is there anybody so inclined if not so testify? Let the record reflect that nobody wishes to testify, make a statement or ask a question. The Committee is at least tem- porarily through with the questions until Mr. Rudd summarizes. Mr. Rudd; Thank you sir. Gentlemen the witnesses have Aresented the testimony antl I believe quite fully regarding the nature of the break-down and the recormnended course of action Shell asks that the, that Conservation. ©rder t05 be modified to permit the flaring of gas in excess of that used on the platform for fuel and in excess of that permitted for the safety flare fora six week period while the repairs that have been described are under- taken. The reasons for recommending this course of action were stated by Mr. Bates. Principally we point out the energy and hours lost by the shut-in would far exceed the value, either heating value or dollar value of the gas that would be flared during this period if production were allowed to go .unrestricted. Mr. Bates, also discussed the possible reservoir damage, the damage #o the wells, which is a subject that has been discussed at this hear- ing and others like it to some length. We have not suggested precise language, I believe that the language for extension for this, extensions of this sort is .fairly routine and it has been adopted in other orders. If you made a re-: quest for us to.~repare language we would be .happy to do so. We have nothing further. Mr. Burrell: Thank you Mr. Rudd. May I ask you a question sir? Mr. Rudd: Yes, Mr. Burrell: You indicated you wanted a modification of Conservation Order 105? Mr. Rudd: Yes, or 105 as amended. -49- • • Mr. Burrell: Yes, right, Would you have any obJectton of the Committee finding this as an emergency. Mr. Rudd: No, i believe this is an ~nergency situation. Mr. Burrell: Well, you asked for modification of it, as rule 2 of 105 or Order to 105 it says flaring or venting etc. prohibited except for the amount necessary for adequate safety flares and and except in emergencies. Mr. Rudd: Emergencies - tt, we could, if this is classified as an emergency Mr. Burrell: That was my intention. Mr. Ruder There is no need for modification but rather a declaration Mr. Burrell: A finding Mr. Rudd: of an emergency. Mr. Burrell: I Just wondered about that. I Just wanted to clarify that one point. Mr. Marshall, do you have a question? Mr. Marshall: No. Mr. Burrell: Mr. Gilbreth? Mr. Gilbreth: Mr. Rudd, you mentioned this six weeks, I'm interested in when this six weeks would. start or when it would end? Mr. Rudd: Oar calculation have been based on today. Mr. Gilbreth: Six. weeks from today? Mr. Rudd; Six weeks from today which i believe takes it to August 3, if t recall. Mr. Burrell: I'm not that good with a calendar.. Mr.-Rudd: l counted it out once, but I Mr. Burrell: August 3 is fine. -50- • • Mr. Rudd: Alright if we follow the court rules v~e'ii eliminate today and sfiart tomorrow as number one, it would be the third. Mr. Burrell: Right. We'ii go off the record for about five minutes, the Committee will rule from the chair on this situation. Mr. Burrell: Gentlemen, the Committee has agreed to modify Con- servation Order t05 as amended, or to further amend it, which ever is the appropriate language to provide that the flaring or venting of excess casinghead gas from the Middle Ground Shoal Field, Platform A is permitted ~,~ i n S until 7:00 AM, Ataska daylight ~ time, August. 3, 1973 or until such earlier date as the problems with-the equipment are remedied with a further provision that this order may be extended for not to exceed thirty days by further order or orders of the Committee, by Administrative Orders of the Committee, and furthermore make no finding as to the economics of the sit- ~uation which we don't believe we're required to by the statutes. Secondly we make specifically no findings as to the potential of reser- voir damage. This order will be written but in view of the .circumstances we fee) it appropriate to issue it orally today. Are there any further comments or questions from anybody? Okay? Does anybody have any anything else? Adjourned. -51- 0 N N O Z H Q U ~. MGS PLATFORM"A" PRODUCTION CA•PACiTY ~ OTHER '' OPERATING DATA OIL PRODUCTION (GRO55~ 32° APl .. 9700 BOP/D CHAS PRODUCTI.ON ' . 5.0 MMCF/D FUEL GAS REgU1REMENTS 1.5 MMCF/D GAS LIFT CAPAUT`((S~ PSIG-UbO PSIU~~l2.5 MMCF/D SAFETY FLARE REQUIREMENTS ~~ ~5 MMCF/D Max.. SALES GAS COMPRESSOR CAPAc~TY. 6.0 MMCF/D AVERAGE GAS. VOLUME SHIPPED -:2.15 MMCF(D VALUE OF OII._. '- ~ 330~BBL. , YALU E .OF GAS ~ p.OI~MtF oR ~ 'lO~MMCF STATE ROYALTY FACTOR X2.5 PRODUGTIaN LOSS US16~G GAS LIFT t,2oQ BB0 COMPRESSORS TO SELL GAS (~l0 ~}0~~ .. 0 N N O z ~a I~ U ~.i ++ ~ 6 % ~f J •~s' f M n o~ ` ~ f • O~ ~: ~' O V S C u ? W N x IJ J O- W Y V ~ O: ~ O W x-" ~yyx i r 1* ~,a. +-71 - t ~` t tl ~ 1f ~ ~ i ~ 1 1 ~~ ' h .a 1, ~ ~I~, ~ ` 1 i I; ~, k~ 1~ ! t f ; I „~ _ . ~ E• ~' ~ ,.~< ~ 1 ,a !I~{113 ~ ,~~~ i,~ ~ c } ~ _~ • ~ ''" ~ ~ 1; « 1 ~ 1 . ^~~-~z+I~J ~~t~ ,~~Cttt ~~a ~t 1~; _G~'r ~ , 1t, ~t, ~ , ,1, f: ~ f:: ~ ~~ ' tT . 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I 1 $ -F t .,y itt 7 ~ , ti rt f t '~+ ~ ~~~ - ~ F Y ~ ~~ ~ { ~ ~ -1 r~ ,.. ! ~.. ~, ! 1 :: IS ~ ' 11 i. ~ h . . ~ . rj. tri : ~ . ~~ rJ .' 1 l - ~ ~. .. ~ - _. <: :,. r.r~~ ~ AO~ItGr,t ~ LJ. ~ :_ ~: +,` ~ :. I ~ ~_ Grp/-~! ~f ".~' ~, ~~~: ~~ ~ P~=l~'~. ~N ~' S~I~ ~-~i~,~~, ~ ~ ~~ G/z~/73 C, 0, /o S" (3 3vH o~L ~1 vNIT soil o~L ¢2 J~11T SH~t,.L PcAr. "C" IJ~IIT PRog~'- .0035 , 0055 .OO~1S pRo6E 3 , 00 45 , 0075 , 0070 P~to6E 4 .Ooo5 ~~q , oo /o ACC Da TA ~r /AO~ Cer~P~~ssoR SPA ~~ • ~ NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES DiViSION OF OIL AND GAS Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Committee Conservation File No. 105-B Re: Middle Ground Shoal Field Platform "A" operated by Shell Oil Corporation MGS "An, "g'' ~ nCrr' nbn ~ nEn ~ nFn ~ and "G" O i ( Poo I s The Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Committee will hold a hearing pursuant to Title II, Alaska Administrative Code, Section 2009 in the City Council Chambers of the Z. J. Loussac Library, 5th Avenue and F Street, Anchorage, Alaska at 9:30 A.M. on June 21, 1973. Flaring of excess casinghead gas resulting from a ma,Jor equipment failure in the gas system of Platform "A" is now taking place. The committee will hear testimony as to whether present circumstances constitute a situation warranting unrestricted production of oil and flaring of excess gas. ~~ . . Thomas R. Marshall, Jr. Executive Secretary Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Committee 3001 Porcupine Drive Anchorage, Alaska 99501 Publish June 9, 1973 AFFIDAI~1°~' OF PU~LICTION STATE OF ALASKA, ) THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT,) ss. -----M~-~x--I~.._~~al~~--------------- being first duly sworn on oath ~~e deposes and says that_.-.._-..-_-_. is the.-Leal CleT'k of the Anchorage News, a daily news- paper. That said newspaper has been approved as a legal news- paper by the Third Judicial Court, Anchorage, Alaska, and it is now and has been published in the English language continually as a daily newspaper in Anchorage, Alaska, and it is now and during all of said time was printed in an office maintained at the aforesaid place of publication of said news- paper. That the annexed is a true copy of a ..~~~-aaZ--PJfl~-~C-E'• 300 as it was pvblTshed in regular issues (and not in supplemental form) of said newspaper for. a period of ..._Or'i.~_.._. insertions, commencing on the g.........day of ---`T~-1rie--------- -,19 ._7~ and ending on the.--_-~_.._..__. day of of _~Ttzl?e---------------- 19-.73-, both dates inclusive, and that such newspaper was regularly distributed to its subscribers dur- ing all of said period. That the full amount of the fee charged for the foregoing publication is the sum of ~ 10 ° C?®which amount has been paid in full at the rate of 25¢ per line; Mini- mum charge $7.50. 9 ,r Su scribed a~sworn to before me this .~_.`fday of.J~ri-~.__..-..., i 9.73. ~;~ ------ ~C_-~-=~--~ =~-~-=------- ~ _. '`;~` Notary Public in and {~ the Stele of Alaska, Third Division, Anchorage, Alaska MY COMMISSION EXPIRES NOTICE OF PQBtIC NEARING STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF NATURgI RESOUttCES DIVISION OF OILS AND GrlS Alaska bil and Gas Conservation Committee: Conservation Fie Mo. tOSaB' Re: Tvliddfe` Ground Shoal- Fieid Pla#forrn ^A" operated by SheUl fl~l Cprporafion MGS .,A:! g,. ..C ~~„ E and G" Oil Pools The,~Afaska Oil and GasConservasion Coinmitt~e willihold a .hearing Rur- suant-to. Title ll, -Alaska AdminisY~a- ~tive .fade, .Section 2009 .in the [ity CounciL;Chambers of the Z. !. LoussaQ Libuary, 5th AuerHUe and F Street, An- chorage,- Alaskaat...93U A.PA. on Lune 21, 1973. Flaripgo£:-`:excess oasinghead gas restnlfirig~from a maipr equipment failute in the 'gas sysfem ot`Platforrn "A`' is now `taking place. The cortimittee will -hear .testiti7ony as' to whether present circumstances constitute a situaifon'warnarnfing un- restricted production. of bdl arnd flar- ing pf gxcess gas. Thomas R: Marshall, Jc 'Executive Secretary Alaska Oil and Gas Conserva- vatiod Committee .3001 Porcopirue 6rive ~+npharage, J4laska 99501. Publish: June 9,'7973 ~Leya! i~otics No. 3050' ~ Y r~ r .~ ~~