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Home My WebLink AboutBinder 1The Deepwater Horizon accident on well "Macondo #I" Gulf of Mexico Results of an internal preliminary evaluation of cause and effect April 2010 40 m aconuaeilpro acouaellpro eepwater Horizon accident n well "Macondo #1" Gulf of Mexico, 20. April 2010 Results of an internal preliminary evaluation of cause and effect Totte Lager/ Terje Magnussen C] • • AGENDA Macondo Mini Seminar August 2010 l . Background for the evaluation and purpose of the mini -seminar 2. The rig and the well 3. Brief sequence of events and objectives of the operation 4. Possible hydrocarbon leak paths S . Well barriers 6. What went wrong? 7. The root cause 8. Conclusion, learning and recommendations A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro DISCLAIMER This Presentation is based on information available to the public from various sources at the time of writing. Acona Wellpro provides no assurance for the accuracy and correctness of the information in the Presentation and the consequences being a result of using the information herein. New and different information may be available at a later stage that can vary or modify the current views. • The information, opinions and analysis contained herein are based on sources believed to be reliable but no representation, expressed or implied, is made as to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. • The opinions contained herein reflect our current judgment and are subject to change without notice. A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro 0 BACKGROUND FOR THE EVALUATION W • Worst accident related to our industry ever 4 a game -changing event which has created large interest • Acona Wellpro (AWP), as the largest independent drilling and wells community in Norway, must be in the forefront of understanding what happened and whether there are important learning points that need to be implemented immediately or not (we are involved in ongoing deep water drilling activities in Norway as we speak) • The accident has resulted in loss of public confidence to our industry, and we must be prepared to stand-up and answer critical questions, based on a the best information available at any point in time and prevent that pre -mature conclusions are being drawn • The future of drilling in Norway in new environmental sensitive areas is at stake, and decisions must be based on knowledge and understanding • AWP may speak on behalf of the industry without being accused of having an hidden/ political agenda A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout aconawellpro • • • PURPOSE OF THE MINI SEMINAR • To summarize the internal evaluation and share it with a wider audience • Present issues which may have contributed to the accident • Present a probable sequence of events, and illustrate the break -down of barriers leading up to the blowout • Provide an arena for discussion and exchange of ideas amongst the seminar attendees NB the exact causes of the blowout might never be known and a lot of information has not been released, but available information gives important information on what happened A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acona wellpro is • "DEEPWATER HORIZON" Source: Transocean • Owned by Transocean - A DEEP WATER "WORKHORSE" • Built in 2001 by Hyundai Heavy Industries Shipyard, Ulsan, South Korea, • Design; Reading & Bates Falcon RBS-8D • 5t" generation Semi, 1 5,000psi rated DP rig • Capable of working in up to 8,000 ft WD • Held Industry's MODU well depth record of 31 ,000 ft. in 4000 ft WD • On contract from BP since delivery A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acouu°ellpro THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER (SOURCE: BP) Riser adapter Flex joint IJAF Upper Annular Preventer used in normal drilling operations for well shut-in rated 1 OK. Annulars Lower Annular Preventer with Casing Stripping Element.. Used for casing stripping purposes, down rated to lower wellbore (Lower Upper) retaining pressure 5K. Blue Yellow' - BSR Blind Shear Rams Cuts drill pipe and seals the well. _ con control Pod pod _ CSR Casing Shear Rams Non -Sealing, cuts drill pipe and casing; is not designed to seal the wellbore. - UPR Upper Pipe Rams Ram packers can close on a range of drill J pipe from 31/2" OD to 6 5/8" OD and seal up to 15K wellbore Blind Shear Ram w� pressure. Casing Shear Ram - MPR Middle Pipe Rams Ram packers can close on a range of drill pipe from 3 1/2" OD to 6 5/8" OD and seals up to 15K wellbore Variable Bore Ram -- pressure, can also be stripped through to hang -off drill pipe up Drill pipe 600K Variable Bore Ram Lower Pipe Rams . Test Ram seals up to 15K pressure from Test Ram above. A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout 40 THE WELL PROJECT MACONDO • First exploration well on the Macondo prospect in 1 544 meters of water • Planned well TD C) 5990 m (Deepwater Horizon world record = 9455 m!) • Spudded Oct. 6, 2009 with rig "Marianas" (AFE 77 days, target 52 days) • Abandoned well following BOP problems and Hurricane "Ida" late November 2009 • Re-entered with "Deepwater Horizon" February 2010 • TD the well @ 5500 m, i.e. 500 m shallow not reaching the 2nd target • The well proved to be a big discovery, and it was decided to change the objective of the well to be a producer, and to abandon the well temporary, and re-enter well for completion w/ another rig (Deepwater Horizon was overdue and expected on another well since long time) A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro • CASING PROGRAM • Casing program "typical" of GoM, w/ many strings and consecutive liners (saves time and casing costs) BP GoM Deepwater Exploration (updating 05/05110) Basis of 3"ign PERATOR'. BP PARTNER; A1nCmk0. MOEX CATS. 31712010_Rev 14 416-16 aft a: tt.586') .YELL NAME: MC 262 91. MACONDC PROSPECT OCS-G32306 PTO 18,650' MDiTVD FIELD: PHOSPEC' WILDCAT AREA OFFSHORE STATE LA RF ELEV. 76' (HO(xOnl SOI IYC. 4007 URFACE LOCATION Xat,2O2,8O3-88 Y�70.A31,6/7.00 PBHL- X•1,202603.88 7•10,431,W.00 EJEC MEZON£f5)' M36 RIGT1an9oeaan Deep--H.0 n DML-0UIP. SS-15 WGBORE 8. 7T" O.D. KCH4 Cart HOLE LPYriH SUdw • 10' DEPTH NM MATH 16.SW',D 15691M SIZE CASING MUD A14 a 30e^ MDmm 30.240" 10�20�Aeepgt) W .��-...-._..._ :6" ewpfam9n15100am, -6227ove ' In 27 oxienaim,1. , kto 375' ID (1.25' 9I ppe ab) JET 34' x 20•.X-65 HC•1D(/MT-FR r I 3S x 1.5'. X-6. 3e01MT 31" 3�21' MQT`JD;2S1 bm() 68°F 87 i 1 1 F.,,0" 1 26' X 32-t �7 [27ezim 26". 216-27pr/ 'CCO-39aT{Uuar+-, «v'8r an "4 93MNT Smv.ft a:th 20' Q 621T MOrM (1160' hm1) 18R 65 'F 1 117 F7T/LO7 T'OC 4 - 3067' M,Y'.'G (Y.�v,, 27%?TA19, X-00, H90Wr eXT eNSONJT Sas.— 26' X ..-.PlCme w >a9Plef g - rL65' 2Z, 221.25P 1''+-2:a Z X-90, 59CNT 9 0 5,06 PP 7937' ;ADITVD (2891''am : ;.ryr 9R °F 10.0 1 ✓. LOT t1K1 I apt ' mi r. 70CR-80/9'.1[27-S'_ } 2ST+, 19-1fC,2i 1�1179 _-. -- :.'� t RN9ry SuvaaN P-110. HYDML 511 SOBAIL. la-6e65' Y.D.'7VD f39071Xn1) aet 122'F : <1 FTTM1OT ; 1GaCm 1 ' 85CL" 913 1 16.5'x20' 16'979 ILe-11. 5. Pp. TOO Q-10.wo. MDrvD 3 ROWY SW.Wft P-110, HYDML fill SOSRI I I -- TOL(�-�: 153'MO ( 11,35 1 IPP 16" 11,636 MO: TVD {6616' Oml) 162 •F 12.56 - 140 rnn-017 T Side Teak 117M TOO Q -f25ar VDITYD j t4-wVx1617 ( Rafanr S[6e U. 1337C 68.20 O-125, H523 118- 121 wo SOBM TOLQ-126ar1D 61,2722 TYD f 1 PP 13 12., ea'ND 1191a2'7W 1aa°F 1 108 rffA I»77> x 13SD E>,p9TWaW�Ltn9e 777 121-13.5 rOCQ-16,0arM0?YD gotwy Sf9aatxe j T0.Q-7>77714D(77'77 TVD I n Lim 1.O � 9-716^ Q 17n6Y MO11T167• Tw t 7 7 M66 r&ggt ham 180a71a 1819C M( ,.:. 7 7 e-7X" e269 10-SWx 12-IW 0t125,?yOn1$23 t3.5-t4.3 ,�?.(^{ 7777717 0-125. "Wrl 523 777777 I 14.3- 14,6 = w SeearaEY Pan %- Canna I SOSM • WELLH EAD Used "Big Bore" WH design to allow installation of extra casing strings in Supplemen-tal Hanger Adapters in 22" extension belo, 18WWH Reservoir casing - first to be installed inside WH (No csg. here - had to set a dummy hanger in order that a Lockdown sleeve could fit on top) 36" Mgid I nrkrinwn Cmductor Weinlead 36" supplements Adapter zz" SupPlemental Adapter 13" Casing Hanger and i Seal Assembly 183h" Rigid lnckdown Wellhead f9'/G Hanger 13 Ya" C:vuw, Hanger 26. casing --`Hanger Dummy Adapter far 16- Casing Hanker i (Used if the is -casing 11anger is not nm) • • EVENTS IN THE WELL: • Hole Problems in 18 '/8"x 22"UR hole, TD Section 1000' high • BOP Problems - had to pull to surface • Hurricane "Ida', had to leave site and repair the Marianas rig • Re-entered the well with new (more expensive) rig 3 mths later • Kick, lost circ. in 16 %Z"x20" UR hole, had to set 16" high • Hole instability, stuck pipe, cut free/lost BHA & sidetrack • Heavy mud losses in the reservoir section (lost 3000 bbls of SOBM) • Did not make it to TD and secondary well target Csg. Size Mudline 36" cond. 28" cond. (acipt.) 22" csg.(BOP) 18" liner (acipt.) 16" csg. (acipt.) 13 5/8" liner 11 7/8" liner 9 7/8" liner • Depth (m) 0 1544 77 1620 350 1890 875 2420 1190 2735 1987 3533 2463 4009 3060 4606 3690 5236 7" x 9 7/8" L 4054 5560 A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon wowout aconawellpro acouaellpro • Wellhead (5067') 36" (5321') 28" (6217') 22" (7937') 18" liner (8969') 16" casing (11585') 13 5/8" liner (13145') 11 7/8" liner (15103') 9 7/8" liner (17168') 9 7/8" x 7" casing (18360') WELL BARRIER OBJECTIVE 1 RAMr/Blind Intended Barriers following Successful Cementing of Reservoir Casing Well Barriers & -elements • Un-perforated Reservoir Casing w/ 2 ea. float valves (inflow tested) • Cement in annulus, w/ verified height (TOC) above top of Reservoir • Previous Liner cement ................................................................................. • Liners, Liner Packers & 16" Casing ................................................................................. • Wellhead and Seal Assembly ................................................................................. • Drilling BOP Note: 1. Seal assembly is not part of the barrier envelope 2. Drilling Fluid in the hole is not required to maintain two independent barriers. Hence, well can be abandoned A ere it-ninary evaluaiiun ut trie ueepwater Horizon Blowout acouaellpro E • DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CASING From a barrier point of view the long casing is fully reliant on a successful primary cement operation, which in itself is a contradiction! Especially in the case of Macondo with a weak formation to seal off, every effort should be made to ensure that primary cementing of the reservoir casing should be successful In the liner case there are several and more robust barriers, and an improved situation for a successful cement job Little did they know before the discovery was made.... Reservoir O Casing "Highway to hell" acowellpro 171 WELL BARRIER OBJECTIVE 2 Intended Barriers following Successful Temporary Plug and Abandonment Well Barriers & -elements • Un-perforated Reservoir Casing w/ 2 ea. float valves (inflow tested) • Cement in annulus, w/ verified height (TOC) above top of Reservoir Secondar • Previous Liner cement ................................................................................. • Liners, Liner Packers and 16" Casing ................................................................................. Is Wellhead and Seal Assembly ................................................................................. • Innermost casing down to 1000 ft. below seabed (MMS/ BOEMRE rules, 3300 ft. on Macondo) ................................................................................ • Bridge plug or 100 ft. Long cement plug Note: Drilling Fluid is suppose to fill annulus space as well as the inside of innermost casing below abandonment plug H Preiminary evaivatlion or the veepwater Horizon Blowout acouaellpro • • BRIEF SEQUENCE OF EVENTS The well was decided abandoned temporarily... � 1. TD'd well in a weak formation and loss zone which had been cured by LCM 2. Ran a full length reservoir casing 3. Had all sorts of issues around cementing and fear of losses 4. However, pumped foam cement and finished pumping w/o reports of any losses S. Sat seal assembly & pressure tested the seal against closed off casing and pipe ram, OK 6. Decided not to run a CBL/ USIT log based on the results of the cement job 7. After 10 hours the casing was pressure tested to 2500 psi for 30 minutes (i.e. not done whilst bumping the top plug). Test OK (but why, creates a micro annulus!) NB Cement simulations had shown that after 24 hours the cement slurry had built no strength, and only after 48 hours it had built a shear strength of 1 590 psi. A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout M • 105 BRIEF SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 8. The cementing operation was considered successful and the abandonment operation proceeded with preparations for installing the abandonment plug and an inflow test, whilst WOC 9. Tripped in hole with workstring/ stinger, and started displacement of mud out of the hole - already 16-18 hours after pumping cement (far too early according to lab test of cement recipe) 10. Pumped the SOBM out of the whole from approx. 1000 m below seabed, using a Hi-vis WBM spacer and seawater, to above the BOP 1 1 . Closed BOP to isolate mud column from well to carry out the inflow/ negative test of the well (seawater also in the kill line) 12. Inconsistency in inflow testing of well (DP pressure never went to zero), 13. Situation was discussed at great length on the rig (mud level had at the same sunk in the riser) but the inflow test was finally accepted A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro 0 0 BRIEF SEQUENCE OF EVENTS The well was decided abandoned temporarily... The natural activity at this point had been to install the abandonment plug, and secured the seal assembly by installing a lock -down sleeve, but these activities were deferred 14. Instead the BOP was opened to displace the riser to seawater (no flow check was carried out, neither any volume control during the displacement) 15. From about 21 :l 4 hrs the flow in and out showed discrepancies, but these were not reacted on by the crew (they had already accepted that the well was safely plugged?) 16. Pumping was resumed at 21 -20 hrs but stopped at 21 -30. Not clear why, and what happened afterwards as all witnesses were killed in the explosion shortly afterwards (more later by Niels Lynge..) 17. At 21 :47 hrs the flow out clearly accelerated, and DP pressure increased sharply 18. At 21 -49 hrs the well blew out and an explosion took place 19. Attempts to initiate the EQD/ EDS was done from the bridge @ 21 :56 hrs A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout °Cowellpro • rft - York in progress. Not all information has been verified / corroborated. Subject to review in light of additional information or analysis iger Lock Down Sleeve bp t - Work in Progress. Subject to Revi 0 18-3/4" SS-15 Big Bore II Well Head Housing 18-3/4X9-7/8" SS-15 CSG HGR Lock Down Sleeve 36 x 1-1/2" WaLL SS-15 Housing Load Ring 5/24/2010 08:20 45 acouaellpro • • • Wellhead (5067') 36" (5321') 28" (6217') 22" (7937') 18" liner (8969') 16" casing (11585') I 13 5/8" liner (13145') 11 7/8" liner (15103') 9 7/8" liner (17168') 9 7/8" x 7" casing (18360') *M POSSIBLE LEAK PATHS How did the inflow of reservoir fluids enter the well bore during or after cementing of the reservoir casing on Macondo #1 ? 1 . Into main bore via shoe track 2. Into casing annulus via: a. Non -cemented annulus at 9 7/8" shoe b. One of the shallower liner laps A Preurninai y evaivation of the ueepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro acouaellpro 4 Illustration o ated barrier development on Macondo 0 0 0 Well Barrier Schematic Macondo Well Wellhead (5067') 36" (5321') 28" (6217') 22" (7937') i I 18" liner (8969') 16" casing (11585') WELL BARRIERS 3 Shear/ Blind RAM During Cementing of Reservoir Casing on Macondo #1 Well Barriers & -elements Fluid column in hydrostatic overbalance (Drilling Fluid and Cement Slurry) • Previous Liner cement ................................................................................. • Liners, Liner Packers & Casing string ................................................................................. • Well head and Seal Assembly ..............:.................................................................. • Drilling BOP 13 5/8" liner (13145') Note: The secondary barrier is illustrated in its 11 7/8" liner (15103') A k ultimate form, but could also have been illustrated with an envelope following the pipe 9 7/8" liner (17168') % ' rams, landing string, hanger running tool, casing and floats, separating the annulus -- from the inside of the casing. 9 7/8" x 7" casing (18360') A vreiiniinary evaivatlon of the ueepwater Horizon Blowout acouaellpro 0 • is Well Barrier Schematic Macondo Well Pressure increases under seal assembly Formation fluids s to migrate upward minor expansion Insufficient cemer to isolate reservoi WELL BARRI FRS 4 Shear/ RAMAssuming failed primary cementing of casing Seal Assembly set and pressure tested Well Barriers & -elements ................................................................................. • Previous Liner cement ................................................................................. • Liners, Liner Packers & Casing Strings ........................................ • Wellhead & Casing Hanger ................................................................................. • Seal Assemblies ................................................................................. • Tapered Reservoir Casing ................................................................................. • Casing float valves • Fluid column in hydrostatic overbalance (Drilling Fluid ) Note: The seal assembly and the casing floats now become part of the primary barrier envelope! The well cannot anymore be abandoned since fluid column now constitutes one of the barriers. A ri eiiiiiliiiary evaluation of the Deepwater horizon Blowout acouaellpro 0 0 0 Well Barrier Schematic Macondo Well Differential press. fm. inflow test causes hanger & seal assembly to slip and leak Formation fluids are entering the well throuqh csq. annulus (C lnosed, WELL BARRIERS 5 Shear/ Blind RAM During displacement to SW/ Inflow test (Leading to failure of Seal Assembly Well Barriers & -elements • Fluid column (no longer) in hydrostatic overbalance (the casing itself does not constitute a complete barrier envelope — even if the floats are holding) • Same as during drilling & cementing csg. Seawater, to Surface in Kill line (1,03 sg.) Reservoir fluid (Oil, Condensate and Gas; — 0,8 sg. ?) Drilling Fluid (1,7 sg.) Note: At this stage the Drilling Pipe pressure never went to zero! H Preliminary evdoucttiuii u Lille Lieepwater Horizon Blowout aco�aellpro • Well Barrier Annular Schematic (Open?) Macondo Well Shear/ Blind _ RAM (Not closed!) Wellhead (5067') 36" (5321') 28" (6217') 22" (7937') 18" liner (8969') 16" casing (11585') 13 5/8" liner (13145') A Ilk 11 7/8" liner (15103') 1 9 7/8" liner (17168') % 9 7/8" x 7" casing (18360') NO WELL BARRIERS After hydrostatic overbalance was lost and gas released on the rig Well Barriers & -elements • Fluid column not in hydrostatic overbalance • BOP did not succeed in shearing and/ or sealing the well bore Note: It is highly unlikely that the casing string is intact at this stage, and several leak paths have probably emerged. r ii eiiiniinary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout aconu�aellpro • 0 • OTHER POSSIBILITIES... • The inflow could also have come through the shoe, or a combination • Very little back pressure on floats (almost no weight difference between fluids in annulus and inside casing) • Pressure tested well far too early - could have blown out cement of shoe track • However, due to the circumstances around the cementing, the primary cement job had a high risk of not qualifying it as a primary barrier acowellpro 0 WHY DID NOT THE BOP STOP THE BLOWOUT? • Questions; did it have the required functions? — was it properly dressed and have enough rams (Sea.), — did it have both shear rams acting in an emergency, — is a test ram the right way to occupy one ram cavity in the BOP, — enough accumulator bottles on the BOP to perform required functions, — could remote acoustic BOP control panel have helped, etc. • The EDS (EQD) system on DWH functioned such that an operation in the sequence of closing in the well and disconnecting the LMRP has to be successfully accomplished before the next one is initiated. — Close pipe ram -+ close shear/ blind ram -+ close annular -disconnect LMRP '14 • Questions about non -documented BOP modifications have been raised - could this have contributed to the malfunction? • Known low battery issue on one of the control POD's, hydraulic leaks in the system was also known. A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro io 6. wha acouaellpro THE PRIMARY CEMENTING FAILED... 1 . TD the well in a weak formation/ heavy loss zone 2. They choose a long casing that had very little chance of cementing success: a) Foam cementing deep in an HPHT well is unusual and nothing BP had done before b) Not ensured proper stand-off by cutting out necessary no. of centralizers (6 ea. instead of recommended 21 ea.!) c) Not carrying out sufficient pre -cementing circulation to clean the annulus (fear to lose the "LCM barrier"), may have circulated reservoir fluids up the annulus before the cement job d) Planned pump rate too low to ensure proper mud removal and cement placement A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout aconawellpro Wr .W- ._a# «0.. doorw OTHER OMISSIONS w r insufficient) verified. 3. The barriers were y a) The result of the cement job was based on observations during the cementing operation (returns etc.), what else? b) No Casing Bond Log (CBL) run c) Inflow test not properly managed and concluded 4. The barriers were not secured and installed prior to displacing the riser to seawater: a) Casing hanger lock down sleeve not run b) Abandonment plug not installed S. Well- and Volume control abandoned during mud displacement a) Crew was relieved over to have "finished" a trouble well and was happy to finish it off. The mindset was that the well was safely plugged....? ..however, some of these may in isolation be argued for.. A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acona llpro aconu�aellpro 9 0 0 COMMON TYPE FAILURES IN ALL ACCIDENT SCENARIOS... A�v 1. Basic design and engineering mistakes ��' a. Questionable casing program, causing cementing short cuts to be made and creating a leak path straight to surface 2. Lack of proper "Management of Change" project: a. Change of rig, crew and contractors b. Change of well objective - major changes under way in the 3. Lack of risk identification and understanding a. Neither consequence of unsuccessful results of decisions made are documented, nor what risk mitigation that was taken, or what contingencies that were in place 4. Absent implementation of basic procedures and controls a. Well and volume control in critical phases of the well S. Not giving safety the highest priority (Walk the talk!) A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro 17J • • V I n CM D/ANNI LN.3 /LilaMI IV 3 1 Mk.A_1 V L 1 N I /AL C V C 1 V 1.3 Basic Risk Management principles • The Macondo well and Deepwater Horizon disaster is a rare example of where a defined situation of hazard and accident has developed into a full blown dimensional accidental event, not seen before in drilling operations • Barriers against accidents are not only technical and operational and "physical" but are also non-physical built around strategic and organizational measures and decisions (was the supervisor really qualified for deep water operations, etc.) • In a safety critical offshore activity such as drilling the Macondo well there are a vast number of non-physical measures that eventually will impact the risk level of the operation: A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout °°owellpro • CAHIVIrLC ur J 1 N/A 1 r-UIl.. HIVV UKUPUNILH I IUIVf-\L IVICf-\JUI CJ 1. The way the activity of planning and executing the activity is resourced, organized, structured and managed (Organizational unit, Teams, Rigs and Contractors, Manning level, Competency assurance and financial support) 2. How the work is carried out (Mgt. guidelines, goals, HSE culture, process, procedures, preparations & planning) 3. How the work is supervised and quality controlled (peer reviews, independent verification, expectations, follow up/ "walk the talk") 4. The way the work program is implemented offshore - routines and processes (internal control, respect for procedures/ instructions) 5. The way that individual competence is utilized (open and honest communication or management by fear) Communicate/ discuss hazards and share important information. A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro • 0 THE ROOT CAUSE...? • Deep water casing design and drilling methods (need to use DGD, dry BOP or other means to be able to drill longer hole sections?) • Complacency and attitude, failure to acknowledge the inherent risks of the activity when it becomes "routine" • Time, Cost and Schedule focus - not risk management • Safety Culture (may vary within the company) (Example) • Best Practices and Best Available Technology was available but not applied • Failure of the regulatory environment that this is still allowed A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro 0 n BP'S RESPONSE AND EXECUTION IS IMPRESSIVE Global Contact us Reports and pt"cations BP worldwide Statistical Review of Gulf of Mexico response Latest reports: BP Authorized to Begin Cementing Procedure on MC252 Well BP has received authorization from the National Incident Commander (NIC) to conduct cementing operations on the MC252 well as part of the static kill procedure. Pumping operations are expected to begin Thursday, August 5th. ► Read the full press release ► Latest technical update on the Gulf of Mexico operations Response quick links: ► Making it right ► Response in pictures ► Response in video Search: GoM response - cont U.S. Coast Guard Joint Infor Center: +1 713 323 167011 Environmental hotline and c information: +1 866 448 581 Wildlife distress hotline: +1 866 557 1401 Volunteers: +1 866 448 581 Register your professional +1 281 366 5511 Vessels of Opportunity- reg to assistwith response: +1 866-279-7983 Do you have ideas to help u +1 281 366 5511 BP America Press Office: +1 281 366 0265 BP Press Office London: +44 20 7496 4076 Investor Relations: +1-281- Claims: 800 440 0858 (T-TY device: 800-572-3053) acowellpro recon rf s aconuaellpro C. • • CONCLUSIONS 1 • This is a "Game Changing Event' regardless of cause, because it is a unique, and never before experienced accident with extreme consequences and huge attention from the public • However, there are in our review of the accident so far no observations of unknowns - nothing has gone wrong which indicate that we as an industry lacks knowledge or have insufficient technology to cope with the challenges of deep water and HPHT wells • World Class industry actor- is in itself not a guarantee for success (BP, Transocean, Halliburton, MI-Swaco, Cameron, etc. all world class companies) • There are good reasons to believe that the cost overruns of the operation led to the hurry to abandon well and led to that a lot of decisions were more focused on saving time than giving the most robust solution A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro A - CONCLUSIONS 2 W • As long as Best Practices and Best Available Technology are applied, we do not need further requirements. What remains is to agree on what these are. • We as an industry now has even more problem with credibility in the eyes of the Public • From a risk assessment point of view it is still "Low risk" to conduct these activities, since the probability of a similar accident to happen again still is extremely low, and probably lower now, than ever before - due to the attention this disaster has created in all companies associated with offshore drilling and by regulatory bodies, and the assurance activities that will follow (... but for how long?) • This is not a deep water related accident... (!) A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout °COWellpro C� LEARNING AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 • There seem to be a problem that guidelines and requirements were not followed - if they had been, the accident should not have happened • Lack of attention to issues like: —Well design / construction —Well risk identification, understanding and control — Management of change —Well barrier verification —Well stability control in ALL phases — Competence, communication and human factor issues — Procedures, job programs and non conformance handling — Management involvement cannot be allowed to happen, but how? A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro LEARNING AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 • We may need to improve and increase the focus on independent verification/ Peer reviews/ audits of all phases of the drilling and well planning and execution (around the clock)? Is the UK system of "Well Examiner" a way to go? • Do we need an international organization that put stringent requirements on our industry like is the case e.g. in the air line industry (an Oil field IATA... ) or the nuclear industry (IAEA) ? • To regain the confidence of the Public, we need to organize the activities such that Best Practices and Best Available Technology are consistently applied in ALL offshore drilling and well operations • The casing design practices in deepwater GoM should be revisited A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acona llpro FINAL QUESTIONS � .e Maybe the "freedom" of each oil company to influence the safety of the operations is too big in todays' regulatory environment? Is there a need for a fundamental change that enforces a totally different way in which safety is secured? In the airline industry no KLM or Air France or SAS decides for themselves what is good enough, and are not allowed to operate without having to obey by international standards and rules A Preliminary evaluation of the Deepwater Horizon Blowout acowellpro "IF YOU FEEL SAFETY IS EXPENSIVE, TRY AN ACCIDENT" Acona Wellpro AS Laberget 24, P.B. 216 NO-4066 Stavanger Tel.+4752977600 ACONAWELLPRO. com