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Home My WebLink AboutBinder 14[ thought processes I W" • • • Attention motivates. And motivated people deliver better results. Particularly for health, safety and the environment. So the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) has produced an attention -getting tool. Thought processes. These texts present issues which the PSA wants to highlight. Each chapter ends with two questions. Read and discuss. Think. Get going. Now NBI The White Paper referred to throughout this publication is available in Norwegian only. [HSEI 2-3 • I brain barrier I The human brain is designed to react to differences. Sudden changes trigger Since organisations consist vigilance and response. Monotony has the opposite effect. You get bored and of people, they can be fooled inattentive. And when nothing happens, you feel secure. in the same way. Research shows that long periods That's how the brain works, and it's functional most of the time. But modern without accidents lead to a society presents us with many circumstances which the brain isn't designed to gradual lowering of safety tackle. It'll then be fooled - you're fooled. barriers in a company. Imagine that you're setting off on a long drive on the first day of your holiday, At the same time, pressure is and it's your first time on a European motorway. Next to you is your partner with often brought to bear to increase productivity. But if the map, and the children are celebrating on the back seat. you get more productive You've read about accidents on European motorways - multiple pile-ups with without a corresponding many killed. So you've resolved to keep in the right-hand lane, where the traffic reinforcement of safety barriers, is only travelling at 130 kilometres per hour. That feels dangerously fast. safety margins also disappear from the system. conditions are You notice a slight vibration in the steering wheel. One of your front wheels pro- then ripe for a major accident. bably needs rebalancing. Uncomfortable, but not dangerous. For safety's sake, Don't be fooled because you keep a good distance from the car in front. You drive, and all goes well. things are going well. That's After a while, the vibration in the steering wheel is no longer noticeable and the precisely when your company has to make an extra effort to speed seems quite okay. You relax, discuss the route with your partner, and check barriers and margins. answer questions from the back seat. Because you feel that things are under control, you get closer to the car in front. References Then you find yourself behind an articulated lorry doing only 100 kilometres per White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) Whealth, safety and the hour. That feels incredibly slow. Time to try overtaking. You move into the environment in petroleum centre lane and step on the accelerator - 130, 140, 150 kilometres per hour. operations, chapters 2 page You're now keeping up with the traffic in the centre lane. You've got to concen- 12 and 3 page 23. trate, but things are under control. It seems okay. So you stay in this lane. After For reflection/discussion a while, 150 kilometres per hour has become a natural condition. Your brain has 1. Are you familiar with all fooled you. the safety barriers in your You're so thoroughly deceived that when your youngest child starts to sob company? inconsolably, you suggest that your partner releases their seatbelt and leans 2. Do you know what condition back to give the child a bottle of juice. And that's exactly when all the brake they're in? lights ahead of you go red. 0 4-5 • [ regulation rigmarole I Complicated regulations Simple truths Complicating bureaucracy - Norway's HSE regulations produce a competitive level of costs if they're Complicated procedures applied correctly and at the right time. Complication -loving penpusher The Lenning and Ognedal inquiries found no significant differences Complicated administrative system between Norwegian and British Complicate value creation regulatory requirements. And we want to keep the differences which do exist. Complicate every process - The HSE regulations permit innovation. Complicate work You can do things your own way as Complicate everything. long as these solutions provide equally good protection for people, the environment and material assets. Completely complicated system of controls? That demands expertise. And dialogue - up, down and across the board. But those with a will find a way. Knowledge doesn't only mean power - it also confers meaning. Perhaps the constraints are more in your head than in the regulations? References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, sections 3.2.6 page 21 and 3.3.1 page 21. For reflection/discussion 3. Are you familiar with the principles in Norway's HSE regulations? 4. Does your company have the expertise required to realise the potential for cost savings if it applies the rules correctly? 6-7 • [ com.plex.no You've probably heard it said before that everything's getting more compli- cated — technology, society, work and family life. When systems become complex, they turn opaque and incomprehensible. Unfamiliar, unplanned and unexpected incidents can happen in such conditions. Such incidents are invisible and incomprehensible. Take the following example. Imagine you have a meeting at 09.00 which is scheduled to last for exactly an hour. Important decisions are due to be made. Without your contribution, they would be less good — perhaps completely wrong. You get up at 07.00. Time enough for a shower. When you reach the kitchen, you're greeted by the smell of burnt coffee. The percolator has been left on all night, and the bottom of the glass bowl is covered with a black, sticky coating. isYou try to scrub it clean, but lose your grip and bang the bowl against the edge of the sink. It smashes to bits — but you still fancy a cup of coffee. So you boil some water and find the jar of instant. After a couple of slurps, the clock says you have to run. As the front door snaps shut behind you, you remember that your keys are still inside. The reserve set is hidden in the car port for just such an occasion. But you recall that a friend still has them from the time they were house-sitting while you went on holiday. You're starting to run short of time. You hasten to the neighbour, apologise, and ask to borrow the car. Sorry, they say, its battery is flat and it's due to go in for repair tomorrow. Well, you say, I'll get the bus at 10 past. Your neighbour tells you that the bus drivers are on strike. You need a taxi at once, and call on your mobile. The number is constantly engaged — with the bus strike, everyone in town is trying to get a cab. You give up, call the office, and explain that you won't be able to make the meeting. When you finally get to work, you learn that the decision taken wasn't the one you wanted. • Such unforeseen interactions characterise complex systems. Trends in the petroleum industry make it likely that its systems will become more complex, with a growing risk of unforeseen coincidences. Two factors in particular contribute to this: increased use of information and communication technology, and the growth in outsourcing. Responses to enhanced complexity include more contingency planning in the organisation, decentralised decision -making, a strong safety culture, and a focus on education and training. References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, chapter 2 page 12, section 4.16 page 47 and section 4.8 page 52. For reflection/discussion 5. How does increased complexity show itself in your work? 6. What does your company do to handle the problem of greater complexity? 8-9 • • • [ oil ageing I If you put a frog in a saucepan of cold water, it jumps out. But put one in a saucepan of water at room temperature - without frightening it - and the frog will settle down. Apply a low heat, and something interesting happens. Your frog does nothing. It actually shows all the signs of enjoying itself. As the temperature rises, the frog will get more and more groggy, until it is unable to jump out. Even though nothing stops it from escaping, the creature just sits there until it is cooked. Why? Because its nervous system is designed to pick up sudden alterations in the environment. The frog quite simply doesn't notice gradual change. The Norwegian oil age has lasted a while, and isn't about to come to an end. But the years have begun to make their mark on facilities and equipment. Mobile units on the NCS are an average of 20 years old - which is the same as their planned operating life. But they're still working. So ageing is a challenge - a difficult one, because age brings creeping changes which are difficult to spot. When is old too old? References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, sections 4.12.2 page 40 and 4.12.3 page 41. For reflection/discussion 7. Do you know the planned operating lives for equipment and installations in your company? 8. How is your company dealing with the ageing of facilities and equipment? • I value vulgarisation I Once upon a time, the Earth was flat - even when it was round - because that was the model people had of it. That knowledge guided their behaviour, discussions and dreams. Information which failed to fit the model remained unused. For all practical and theoretical purposes, the Earth was flat. Saying that HSE pays off is politically correct. It gets hailed as a regular gold mine in festive speeches. But everyone knows that the Earth is flat. When budgets are drawn up and resources allocated, HSE has become unprofitable. Even if it isn't. That's because the prevailing economic models fail to incorporate all the value created by HSE. Looking after HSE contributes to better regularity, improved quality, reduced sickness absence, lower insurance premiums, fewer compensation payments and enhanced reputation. Such types of value creation can be incorporated in economic models, but other forms remain invisible. What kind of value does a fire engine create when nothing is burning, or an MOB boat when nobody falls into the sea? As surely as the Earth is round, we know that HSE creates value. • References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, section 3.2.5, page 20. For reflection/discussion 9. Do you know how HSE contributes to value creation in your company? 10. Is the contribution made by HSE clearly indicated in your company's accounts? 12 - 13 • I soft myth ] Soft meetings Hard facts Softer cushions Ten people killed in 1993-2002 in work under PSA area of responsibility. Soft people - The PSA registered 508 personal Soft things injuries in 2002. Soft systems In the same year, the PSA received 655 reports of work -related illness. Softer seats HSE deals the way technology and Soft lighting work organisation must be in order to Softer carpets prevent workers being killed or injured. Soft managers It's about well design, safety valves, firewalls, gas detectors, accessibility of equipment, user and maintenance Sissy work? • friendliness, lifeboats, shift patterns, safety meetings and much, much more. References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, sections 2.3.3 page 15, 2,3,4 page 16 and 3.2.5 page 20. For reflection/discussion 11. How far does your company under- stand what HSE is really about? 12. What attitudes does your company have towards HSE? 0 iIIMIIIliI61 • [ safe backbone ] Human behaviour is endlessly varied. You can basically do anything at the start of a new day. Stand on your head in the shower, sing the national anthem on the front steps or butcher a dog and serve it for dinner. But you probably won't. Because, as a rule, the way you and other people behave is fairly predictable. That's because our actions are determined to a great extent by the culture in which we grow up. However, different cultures produce different behaviour patterns. They eat dogs in China, and think nothing of it. Safety is also a cultural outcome. Take the civil aviation industry. Almost every aspect of it is subject to international standards. Pilots, ground crew and maintenance engineers have the same training. Airports are the same for everyone. And the various airlines use the same • types of aircraft. Yet passenger risk varies by a factor of 40 between the best and worst companies. Part of this can be attributed to airline finances and national conditions. But it mostly comes down to differences in organisational culture — more specifically, safety culture. This deals with the way people think, feel and interact over safety, and develops when they work together. Such communities of practice reward and condemn specific kinds of behaviour. If appropriate behaviour is rewarded and undesirable actions are condemned, a safe way of working emerges over time. To develop a safety culture, the management must be aware of how to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. And it must ensure that safe working is never punished — ever. A practice has become culturally determined when it feels wrong to do it differently. It resides more in your heart than in your head — and is built into your backbone. U References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, sections 3.2.3 page 20 and 4.8 pages 36 and 37. For reflection/discussion 13. Is there agreement in your company about where the boundary runs between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour? 14, How does your company respond to unacceptable behaviour? 16 - 17 i Z /�-��- 0 [ wising up Major accidents seldom have a single cause. With hindsight, you find that disasters result from a series of minor incidents. Each on its own is harmless, but they become catastrophic in combination. Cause and effect can easily be identified when you look back. Being wise after the event is a precise science. By then, though, it's already happened. You naturally learn to avoid similar events. The problem is that the next incident won't be the same. To avoid accidents, you can't only look back. You also have to be wise before the event, try to understand what might go wrong. You've got to seek to predict how minor incidents can combine to create a major accident, as when: • two safety valves are left in the wrong position after maintenance • a warning light is covered by a maintenance tag • an indicator lamp has been designed with indirect feedback • a control panel has hundreds of low -priority alarms the operator has received no realistic crisis training Being wise in advance is difficult, but not impossible. It's an art. And, like all forms of art, it is a product of knowledge, inspiration, variation and creativity. So the company's collective knowledge must be activated. Only when a number of people pool their ideas can possible accident scenarios be identified. And never stop being afraid. If you forget the hazards involved in your work, you won't be thinking about what might go wrong. LJ References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, sections 2.3 page 13 and 3.6.4 page 27. For reflection/discussion 15. Are you familiar with all the sources of risk in your work? 16, How does your company seek to predict possible accident scenarios? 18-19 0 [ vulnerable arrogance ] Vulnerability deals with the relationship between cause and effect. A vul- nerable system can be completely disabled — permanently — by a single non-conformance or a series of errors. That sounds dramatic, and fairly unlikely. But it has happened: • Alexander L Kielland flotel • P-36 floating platform • Piper Alpha platform • Sleipner A GBS. And it can happen again. Because vulnerability begins in the brain. When things are going well, people easily become over -confident. Traditional constraints are challenged and established practices rejected. • The consequences spread to the rest of the production system in the form of untried technology, complex solutions, faster execution times and nar- rower safety margins. There's no such thing as zero risk. We must live with that. There will always be an element of uncertainty in the design and operation of a production system. We don't know everything. And there are things we don't know that we don't know. Vulnerability arises when we fail to take account of that uncertainty. Robust systems are created by reducing uncertainty and risk. That calls for knowledge, an overall perspective, systematic use of safety margins and observing the precautionary principle. 0 References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) - On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, sections 2.2 page 13, 3.2.4 page 20 and 4,16 page 47. For reflection/discussion 17. Has your company carried out a vulnerability analysis? 18. Is your company more vulnerable today than 10 years ago? 20-21 /I [ document dictatorship ] Routine documents Documented procedures Document management routines Digitised procedure documents Computerised document management systems Systematic quality assurance documents Documented reporting routines Electronic governing documents Mentor documents. • Total verbal knowledge control? Tacit knowledge Quality management and documentation were put on the agenda in the 1980s. That was timely and necessary. At the same time, information and communication technology was making rapid advances. When these two trends met, the belief emerged that all knowledge could be digitised. Many companies now devote substantial resources to large computer systems in a bid to solve quality and safety problems. Without success. That's because much HSE knowledge quite simply can't be digitised. This is the kind of tacit knowledge which sits more in the hands than the head. It's like riding a bike. You can do it, but can't explain how. Much important HSE knowledge is both tacit and collective. Studies show that up to 80 per cent of the know-how in an organisation falls under this heading. Such knowledge resides in communities of practice, and makes it possible for individuals to interact with others. So knowledge manage- ment for HSE is as much a matter of cultivation as of documentation. References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, sections 4.7 page 36 and 4.18.1 page 52. For reflection/discussion 19. How much understanding does your company have of tacit collective knowledge? 20. How does your company manage knowledge in the HSE field? 22 - 23 /� /� V � V '[ 1 �, 4 �! 0 I reputation alert I Companies used to be able to hide away, be poor at HSE, without many people noticing. They might incur a fine, or perhaps a claim for compensation — but no serious consequences. There are no hiding places today. Information flows from mobile phone to mobile phone, from PC to PC. Someone in Zimbabwe knows within seconds what has happened in the North Sea. Before the media reports it and long before the company's press spokes- person has had a chance to respond, consumers have organised a world-wide campaign via boycott.net. Welcome to the networked economy. In this new reality, consumers are better informed than ever. And they are no long passive recipients of press releases. They actively seek knowledge, and willingly share it with others. At the same time, a shift is taking place from utility to values. More and more people are opting for products and services which express something about themselves: • do I walk about in joggers made with child labour? • do I sit comfortably in a sofa produced by slaves? • do I buy petrol from an oil company who pollutes the coastline? • do I work for an immoral enterprise? That's how consumers think today. And so do employees. Reputation has become more important for both recruitment and revenues. So more and more companies are keen to show social responsibility. Good HSE work is always motivated from within. It can't be imposed by outside force. Somebody who isn't motivated by what we're talking about here, probably won't be motivated by the clear message being transmitted by the authorities. This states that a company's HSE reputation means a lot for its development opportunities on the NCS and elsewhere. Companies which take their standing on HSE lightly are showing poor judgement. 11 References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, box 1.3 page 9 and section 3.2.5 page 21. For reflection/discussion 21. What sort of HSE reputation does your company have? 22. What is the value of a good HSE reputation for your company? 24 - 25 a �'- �, ti • [ an endless task I Sisyphus was a Greek king briefly raised from the dead by the gods to complete some unfinished business. However, returning to life made him very happy. The world seemed so incredibly beautiful, and being alive was full of meaning. He refused to die again. As a punishment, he was condemned to roll a heavy stone up a hill. This job took all his strength, sagacity and willpower. Before he reached the top, however, the gods caused the stone to roll back down again. And Sisyphus had to start all over again. Implementing HSE is a tough job, with one problem following another — to ensure that nothing happens. This tends to be forgotten by both managements and politicians. And naturally by economists. HSE is taken for granted. Uncertainty over future oil prices comes up for frequent and energetic discussion. But everyone is convinced that a platform will neither collapse nor explode. HSE gets taken for granted. So you don't hear a Norwegian prime minister say in their New Year speech that "we once again succeeded in producing oil and gas without a major accident". Nor does the finance minister express gratitude that more billions of kroner have flowed into the Government Petroleum Fund without loss of life. You don't win acclaim for non-events, even when they represent an achievement. Because good HSE is something that must be achieved. It's a condition which has to be created and recreated — day after day, year after year. The PSA's role is to supervise that good work on HSE is maintained, that somebody continues to roll the stone up the hill even when everything's going well and the focus involuntarily shifts from HSE to USD. Particularly then, in fact. Only if we manage to keep on rolling will Norway remain a pioneer in offshore health, safety and environmental protection. 0 References White Paper no 7 (2001-2002) On health, safety and the environment in petroleum operations, section 2.3 page 13, and chapter 3 pages 19-28 and chapter 4. For reflection/discussion 23. What do you think of the commitment to HSE in your company? 24. What do you think of the PSA's commitment to HSE? 26 - 27 Published by: Petroleum Safety Authority Norway Prof Olav Hanssens vei 10 P O Box 599 NO-4003 Stavanger Norway Tel: +47 51 87 60 50 E-mail: postboks@ptil.no www.psa.no [HSEI I